LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA, 


GIFT    OF 


o 


Class 


MAJOR  GENERAL 


NDREW  ATKINSON  HUMPHREYS 


R 


UNITED  STATES  VOLUNTEERS 


AT 

I  FREDERICKSBURG,  VA.,  DECEMBER  13™,  1862 

AND 


A 


FARMVILLE,  VA.,  APRIL  ?TH,   1865 


BY 


HENRY  H.  HUMPHREYS 


press  of 

R.  R.  McCABE  &  CO. 
CHICAGO. 


MAJOR  GENERAL 
ANDREW  ATKINSON  HUMPHREYS 

UNITED  STATES  VOLUNTEERS 


AT 

FREDERICKSBURG,  VA.,  DECEMBER  13™,  1862 

AND 

FARMVILLE,  VA.,  APRIL  VTH,   1865 

BY 

HENRY  H.  HUMPHREYS 


Press  of 

R.  R.  McCABE   &   CO. 
CHICAGO. 


Copyright,  1896,  by 

HENRY  H.  HUMPHREYS, 

Fort  Sheridan,  Illinois. 


OF 

ANDREW  ATKINSON  HUMPHREYS, 

SCHOLAR,    SAVANT  AND   SOLDIER.       A    MAN  TO   BE   I,OVED, 

ADMIRED   AND   FEARED.        KIND,   COURTEOUS 

TO  AND  CONSIDERATE  OF  AI,!, 

MEN. 


225793 


prefatory. 


SOME  explanation  is  due  to  those  who  will  read  these  pages 
why  the  writer  has  written  of  one,  who,  though  well 
known  in  his  official  capacity  as  an  expert,  is  to  many 
Americans  comparatively  unknown.  Although  untoward  cir 
cumstances  have  prevented  its  appearance  before,  it  at  last 
takes  form.  It  arose  from  some  reflections  cast  (by  the  author 
of  the  History  of  the  2d  Corps,  Army  of  the  Potomac)  upon 
General  Humphreys'  Official  Report  of  the  part  taken  by  the 
Division  commanded  by  him  at  the  Battle  of  Fredericksburg, 
Virginia,  December  13,  1862.  All  correspondence  with  those 
having  knowledge  of  the  subject,  was,  in  every  case,  submitted 
to  the  Historian  of  the  2d  Corps.  It  is  assumed  that  General 
Humphreys'  abilities  as  a  soldier  would  best  be  illustrated  by 
their  display  on  the  field  of  battle,  when  in  command  of  troops. 

Fredericksburg  was  his  first  opportunity,  and  it  is  deemed 
fitting  to  bring  forward  in  connection  with  that,  his  last  one 
also,  at  Farmville,  Virginia,  April  7,  1865. 

General  Humphreys  saw  service  as  Chief  of  Topographical 
Engineers,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  from  March,  1862,  until 
August  of  same  year,  under  General  G.  B.  McClellan.  He 
was  then  given  command  of  a  Division  of  Pennsylvania  Volun 
teers.  This  command  was  mustered  out  in  May,  1863.  He 
was  then  assigned  to  the  command  of  a  Division  of  the  3d 
Corps,  formerly  General  Hooker's.  He  commanded  this  Divi- 

5 


PREFATORY. 

sion  at  Gettysburg  with  consummate  ability,  and  exhibited  on 
that  field  the  same  characteristics  which  were  so  conspicu 
ously  displayed  at  Fredericksburg,  Virginia. 

On  July  8,  1863,  he  accepted  the  position  of  Chief  of  Staff 
to  General  G.  G.  Meade,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
which  position  he  held  until  relieved  at  his  own  request.  Gen 
eral  Humphreys  was,  by  direction  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  then  assigned  to  the  2d  Corps,  in  November, 
1864.  He  commanded  this  gallant  Corps  until  it  was  mustered 
out  of  service,  in  June,  1865.  Subsequently  he  resumed  study 
of  the  intricate  problems  of  his  profession  as  an  Engineer, 
which  had  been  interfered  with  by  the  war.  At  his  request 
he  was  retired  from  active  duty  on  June  30,  1879,  and  died  at 
a  ripe  age  at  his  home  in  Washington  City,  D.  C.,  December 
27,  1883. 

The  writer  leaves  it  to  those  who  read  this  paper  to  draw 
their  own  conclusion,  feeling  there  can  be  but  one  deduction 
drawn  from  its  perusal,  and  that  the  result,  when  reached,  will 
redound  to  the  credit  of  Andrew  Atkinson  Humphreys.  The 
task  of  the  writer  has  been  attended  by  many  difficulties.  It 
is  admitted  that,  by  reason  of  kinship,  he  may  not  have  been 
wholly  free  from  bias.  To  what  extent  he  has  been  successful 
in  keeping  all  feeling  in  subjection,  the  reader  will  judge. 
The  writer  makes  no  pretense  at  literary  effort  and  accepts 
responsibility  for  all  statements. 


jfrebericksburo, 

DECEMBER   13TH,   1862 


"PRINCIPIA,  NON  HOMINES." 


DURING  the  last  days  of  the  y ear  1883,  the  writer  was 
called  to  Washington  City  by  the  death  of  General 
Humphreys.  Whilst  there  he  received  a  communica 
tion  from  General  Francis  A.  Walker,  Historian  of  the  2d 
Corps,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  requesting  a  copy  of  General 
Humphreys'  Official  Report  of  the  part  taken  in  it  by  the 
division  which  he  commanded  at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg, 
Virginia.  The  report  \vas  furnished,  and  afterwards  a  copy  of 
the  work  upon  \vhich  General  Walker  had  been  engaged  was 
received.  The  writer  naturally  turned  to  that  part  devoted  to 
the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  and  found  therein  certain  adverse 
reflections  or  comments  upon  Humphreys'  Division  in  that 
bloody  engagement.  One  of  these  comments  or  aspersions  is 
found  on  page  186  of  the  history  and  reads: 

"It  is  very  likely  true  that  among  the  thousands  a  few 
may  have  called  out  to  Allabach's  and  Tyler's  men  that  it  was 
useless  to  go  forward,  but  their  own  situation  on  that  field 
swept  by  fire,  is  proof  enough  that  such  men  were  very  few,  if, 
indeed,  the  story  is  not  the  tale  of  some  colonel  or  captain  to 
excuse  the  breaking  of  his  o\vn  command. ' ' 

It  would  have  been  far  better  when  writing  of  past  events 
to  have  left  out  all  controversies  and  consigned  them  to 
oblivion.  But  since  General  Walker  has  seen  fit  to  notice 
them  he  must  assume  all  responsibility  for  their  correctness, 
and  must  stand  or  fall  by  them.  His  history  probably  has 
been  widely  read,  for  he  occupies  a  high  position  in  the  world 

7 


MAJOR  GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

of   letters,    and   wields   no   small   influence   in  the   realms   of 
thought. 

A  story  like  the  above  after  adoption  and  circulation  by 
a  gentleman  of  credit  is  hard  to  disprove,  but,  the  writer 
observes,  such  flings  as  the  above  lead  a  careful  and  thoughtful 
reader  to  suspect  the  ' '  history  ' '  in  these  matters  in  dispute 
savors  somewhat  of  romance.  The  writer  is  of  a  generous 
nature  and  believes  all  men  are  actuated  by  honesty  of  purpose. 
This  standard  he  has  set  up  for  his  guidance  in  all  dealings 
with  mankind,  and  this  without  reflecting  upon  General 
Walker,  and  acting  in  accordance  with  this  motive,  he  wrote 
requesting  these  comments  be  removed,  giving  reasons  for  such 
request  and  his  version  of  what  he  had  seen  and  heard  during 
that  action.  The  writer  did  not  retain  a  copy  of  his  letter,  but 
the  reply  of  General  Walker  will  show  in  terms  its  purport. 


[COPY] 

BOSTON,  December  24,  1886. 

MY  DEAR  COI,ONEI,  HUMPHREYS:— Many  thanks  for  your  letter  of 
the  I4th  instant.  Your  statement  that  you  personally  heard  some  of  the 
men  lying  on  the  ground  at  Fredericksburg,  try  to  dissuade  men  of  Gen 
eral  Humphreys'  Division  from  going  forward  against  the  stone  wall, 
is  conclusive  on  that  point.  This  may  have  occurred  at  the  spot  where 
you  were,  without  being  at  all  general.  I  say  in  my  History,  "  it  is  very 
likely  true,  that  among  these  thousands,  a  few  may  have  called  out  to 
Allabach's  and  Tyler's  men  that  it  was  useless  to  go  forward,"  etc. 

There  is  therefore  no  necessary  antagonism  between  us  on  that  sub 
ject.  I  do  not  understand  your  statement  that  "General  Humphreys 
never  in  his  official  papers  places  anything  there  that  is  not  known  to 
him  personally."  I  confess  that  my  own  experience  and  observation  as 
a  Staff  Officer,  do  not  allow  me  to  comprehend  how  a  Commanding 
Officer  could  possibly  report  in  adequate  detail  the  operations  of  a  Corps, 
a  Division,  a  Brigade  or  a  Regiment  even,  without  putting  down  a  great 
deal  which  he  did  not  personally  see,  and  for  the  truth  of  which  he 
would  be  obliged  to  depend  on  the  testimony  or  reports  of  his  Staff  and 
his  subordinates,  although  the  good  commander  will  always  subject  such 
testimony  and  reports  to  a  severe  scrutiny,  and  will  sift  all  statements 


AT  FREDERICKSBURG,  VIRGINIA.  9 

carefully,  before  incorporating  any  matter  in   his  own   official   report 
which  did  not  fall  within  his  personal  observation. 

As  to  the  question  whether  any  men  of  Humphreys'  Division  went 
nearer  the  stone  wall  than  did  men  of  the  2d  Corps,  it  is  not  likely  we 
shall  come  to  an  agreement.  You  have  your  opinion  formed  from  your 
own  observation  of  Humphreys'  charges,  in  which  you  participated  as  I 
can  personally  testify,  with  great  gallantry.  I  was  at  one  time  not  fifty 
yards  from  your  Staff  and  was  struck  with  admiration  at  the  heroic  brav 
ery  of  the  General  and  his  young  friends.  The  fact  that  at  the  time  the 
2d  Brigade,  Humphreys'  Division,  reached  its  most  advanced  position 
there  were  then  no  troops  further  to  the  front  at  the  point  where  you  per 
sonally  were,  is,  however,  not  evidence  that  there  may  not  have  been 
troops  two  (2)  hours  or  more  presumably,  or  that  other  troops  may  not 
have  advanced  nearer  to  the  stone  wall  at  some  other  point  of  the  Con 
federate  line.  My  opinion  was  formed  from  a  personal  observation  of 
the  fight  from  the  moment  French's  skirmishers  went  forward  until  the 
last  shot  was  fired  after  dark,  confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  scores  of 
Commanding  and  Staff  Officers.  I  have  no  doubt  as  to  the  truth  of  my 
representation  but  I  cannot  claim  that  those  who  think  otherwise  shall 
yield  their  opinion  to  mine.  I  fear  we  must  agree  to  disagree  on  this 
point. 

Respectfully  yours, 


(Signed),    FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 


H.  H.  HUMPHREYS, 
U.  S.  A. 


Men  have  rarely  enjoyed  such  close  relationship  with  Hum 
phreys  as  the  writer.  No  one  knew  this  man's  moods  and 
tenses,  mode  of  action,  or  thought,  better  than  his  son,  w7ho  was 
with  him  at  home,  in  his  office,  and  in  the  field.  General 
Walker's  failure  to  appreciate  what  has  been  stated  of  Hum 
phreys  (see  Walker's  letter),  was  therefore  from  lack  of  associa 
tion.  Association  affords  opportunity  for  concise  judgment  of 
character.  We  then  see  the  foibles  and  virtues  possessed  of  by 
the  individuals,  who,  under  simple  or  complex  environments, 
emit  light  or  remain  in  darkness.  We  readily  perceive  gener 
osity,  fear,  envy,  courage,  and  the  ability  to  master  the  problem 
or  problems  set  before  us,  or  the  reverse.  Association  is 


io  MAJOR  GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

therefore  the  micrometer,  by  which  we  correctly  measure  and 
value  the  many  characteristics  which  makes  man  great  or 
small.  Association  is  the  crucible  which  reduces  the  baser 
qualities  to  a  film,  and  cognizes  the  nobler  ones,  pure  and 
undefiled.  Judgment  of  character,  based  upon  sources  of  in 
formation  other  than  association,  is  liable,  nay  sure  to  be 
warped,  dwarfed  or  distorted,  simply  from  the  lack  of  oppor 
tunities  for  proper  observation. 

Humphreys  relied  upon  what  he  himself  saw,  and  wrote 
accordingly.  Nothing  escaped  his  analytical  brain.  But 
Humphreys  was  upon  the  actual  field.  Undaunted  by  the 
horrible  sights  then  present,  or  the  groans  and  shrieks  of  the 
wrounded;  unheeding  the  sharp  whistles  of  the  bullets  as  they 
speeded  on  to  their  billets,  or  the  crash  of  bursting  shells;  he, 
calm,  deliberate,  with  those  grey  eyes  missing  nothing,  erect  in 
saddle,  gave  orders  for  the  two  charges,  in  person  superintended 
their  formation,  and  personally  led  them  against  the  stone  wall. 
No  wonder  the  Brigades  were  defeated  in  their  two  attempts  to 
carry  the  wall  (led  on  by  one  who  thoroughly  impersonated  the 
God  of  War).  When  retiring  from  off  this  bloody  field,  one  of 
them  (a  brigade)  caught  up  from  the  lips  of  their  commander 
the  words  of  the  song  "I  will  be  fat  and  greasy  still,"  and 
repeated  it  in  thundering  tones  as  they  moved  off  the  ground 
with  orderly  step.  (See  testimony  of  the  Confederate  General 
Ransom.  "  Antietam  and  Fredericksburg.") 

As  to  what  his  division  did  he  could  speak  from  absolute 
knowledge  and  personal  contact  with  the  troops  engaged. 
This  was  his  line  of  conduct  throughout  the  war,  either  as  a 
staff  officer,  chief  of  staff,  or  commander  of  troops.  In  all 
cases  he  was  ever  to  the  front,  and  as  near  to  the  enemy  as  the 
nearest  troops.  The  accomplishments  of  General  Humphreys 
as  a  soldier  and  commander  of  troops  engaged  in  warfare  has 
frequently  been  commented  upon  by  officers  of  high  rank  in 
the  army  with  which  he  served.  Their  opinions  are  well 
known.  Furthermore,  all  commended  and  recognized  him  as 
a  man  of  superior  attainments,  and  well  fitted  for  any  emerg 
ency  requiring  the  display  of  the  peculiar  qualities  with  which 


AT  FREDERICKSBURG,  VIRGINIA.  n 

he  was  gifted.  Those  who  do  not  wish  to  accept  this  as  a 
truth  are  referred  for  confirmation  to  a  work  edited  by  Dr. 
Fred.  Humphreys,  of  New  York  City,  or  by  communicating 
with  Major  General  J.  Watts  De  Peyster,  of  that  city,  or  at 
Tivoli,  New  York  State,  his  county  seat. 

In  the  work  of  General  Longstreet,  recently  published,  it  is 
noticed  in  writing  of  the  charges  of  Humphreys'  Division,  he 
uses  the  adjective  "desperate."  When  relating  what  was  seen 
of  the  other  charges  of  that  day  preceding  those  of  Humphreys, 
this  essential  wrord  does  not  appear  in  its  qualifying  sense. 
General  Walker  defends  his  work,  claiming  authority  to  write 
for  those  of  whom  it  is  his  duty  or  right  to  speak  of.  Surely 
he  does  not  deny  it  to  me;  I  come  properly  to  mine  by  inherit 
ance,  and  his  is  either  by  request,  vote  or  detail.  With  the 
writer  there  is  no  juggling  with  words. 

On  page  187,  same  work,  the  author  of  the  "  History  of 
the  2d  Corps,"  speaks  of  Humphreys'  "superb  leadership," 
and  remarks,  "and  yet  there  was  something  in  the  way  that 
studious,  scholarly  officer  of  engineers,  led  his  troops,  especi 
ally  the  brigade  of  Tyler,  up  against  the  stone  wall,  which 
filled  all  beholders  with  admiration." 

It  is  suspected  this  "superb"  rhetorical  display,  this 
sugar-coated  pill,  was  put  in  there  to  appease  or  soothe  the 
feelings  of  those,  who,  reading  this  work  (General  Walker's 
History),  have  ever  denied  there  was  on  that  blood-stained 
field,  any  officer  who  was  or  could  be  the  peer  of  Humphreys. 

The  writer  will  gladly  admit,  on  presentation  by  General 
Walker,  any  officer  as  the  peer  of  Humphreys,  who  behaved 
as  Humphreys  did,  and  under  like  conditions  and  circum 
stances,  and  by  this  is  meant  an  exact  counterpart  in  all  its 
details.  The  writer  challenges  comparison. 

Having  succeeded  in  obtaining  from  General  Walker  a 
partial  correction,  to  be  made  in  all  future  editions  of  his  work 
(see  his  letter),  the  writer  has  from  that  time  forward,  been 
collecting  evidence  to  adduce  other  troops  than  those  of  the 
2d  Corps,  went  nearer  the  stone  wall  that  day.  He  now  pre 
sents  his  side. 


12  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

[COPY.] 

We,  the  undersigned  Officers  of  the  first  and  second  Brigades,  3d 
Division,  5th  Army  Corps,  when  on  the  battlefield  of  Fredericksburg, 
December  13,  1862,  after  reaching  our  farthest  point  forward,  upon 
making  the  charge  upon  the  stone  wall  at  foot  of  Mayre's  Heights,  recol 
lect  that  the  ground  between  our  front  line  and  foot  of  stone  wall  was  not 
encumbered  by  the  bodies  of  soldiers  lying  thereon,  either  dead  or 
wounded,  and  it  is  our  belief  that  we,  as  a  unit,  went  nearer  to  that  stone 
wall  (on  that  day)  than  any  other  troops. 

(Signed),  EDWARD  JAY  AI,I,EN, 

Colonel  155  Pa.  Vols. 
(Signed),  P.  H.  AI,I,ABACH, 

Colonel  131  Pa.  Vols.,  Commanding  2d 
Brigade,  3d  Division,  5th  Corps. 

(Signed),  HENRY  H.  HUMPHREYS, 

Captain  I5th  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.,  late 
ist  Lieut.  H2th  Reg't,  Penn.  Vols., 
A.  D.  C.  to  General  Humphreys,  who 
was  present  on  the  field  and  saw  with 
his  own  eyes,  being  near  General 
Humphreys,  who  was  in  advance 
some  ten  yards  of  the  line  of  troops 
commanded  by  General  Humphreys. 

(Signed),  B.  F.  KIEFER, 

Captain  Company  "H,"  I3ist  Reg't 
Penn.  Vols.,  late  2d  Brigade,  3d 
Division,  5th  Army  Corps,  Sunbury, 
Penn. 


[COPY.] 

We,  the  undersigned  officers  of  the  ist  and  2d  Brigades,  3d  Division, 
5th  Army  Corps,  when  on  the  battlefield  of  Fredericksburg,  December 
13,  1862,  and  making  the  charge  upon  the  stone  wall,  led  by  General  A. 
A.  Humphreys  in  person,  while  passing  over  the  troops  of  the  2d  Corps 
lying  on  the  ground,  heard  the  following  expressions  used  by  them  to 
us:  "Don't  go  forward,  it  is  useless,  you  will  be  killed,"  or  words  to 
same  effect,  and  saw  the  men,  who,  lying  on  the  ground,  put  forth  their 
hands,  catching  hold  of  our  men  by  the  trousers,  blouses,  canteens,  and 
haversacks. 

(Signed),  R.  W.  PATTEN, 

Major,  i3ist  Reg't  Penn.  Vols. 


AT  FREDERICKSBURG,  VIRGINIA.  13 

(Signed),  C.  S.  MARKS, 

Private,  Company  "D,"  I3ist  Penn.  Vols. 
I  was  so  close  to  the  stone  wall  that 
there  was  not  a  dead  body  on  the  field 
in  front  of  me.  I  was  wounded  about 
twilight  within  about  eighty  feet  of  the 
wall. 

(Signed),  W.  H.  FELIX, 

Private,  Company  "K,"  I3ist  Penn.  Vols. 
The  above  is  correct.     /  was  there, 

(Signed),  W.  H.  KITTING, 

Private,  Company  "K,"  I3ist  Pa.  Vols. 
I  was  wounded  near  the  stone  fence. 

(Signed),  Lieut.  DANIEL  B.  WEBER, 

Company  "K,"  I3ist  Pa.  Vols. 
(Signed),  GABRIAL  CARPENTER, 

Company 
(Signed),  H.  R.  KORNIG, 

Company  "D,"  I3ist. 
(Signed),  ROB'T  H.  JUNKINS, 

Col.  Guard,  Company  "K,"  I3ist  Reg't 

Pa.  Vols. 
(Signed),  PETER  LAUDUNSTAGOR, 

Company  "K,"  I3ist  Reg't  Pa.  Vols. 

(Signed),  GEO.  MEYERS, 

Company  "  K,"  I3ist  Reg't  Pa.  Vols. 


[COPY.J 

LEWISTOWN,  MIFFLIN  Co.,  PA.,  March  4th,  1887, 
MY  DEAR  COLONEL:    I  have  gotten  some  of  the  privates  to  sign  the 
enclosed  statements.     All  the  men  that  have  signed  it  are  men  of  stand 
ing  in   this  community   and  their   testimony  is  of    the   very  highest 
character.     You  can  attach  this  letter  to  the  statement. 

Very  respectfully, 
(Signed),     ROBERT  W.  PATTEN, 

Major  I3ist  Penn.  Vols. 


[EXTRACT.] 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  June  25,  1887. 

MY  DEAR  MAJOR:     "  I  find  with  them,  as  with  me,  a  great  reluct 
ance  to  reflect  upon  the  men  of  the  2d  Corps,  although  your  printed 


14  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

statement,  enclosed,  is  perfectly  correct.  The  expressions  used  were  not 
only  as  you  state,  but  also  the  cry  '  halt '  was  made  so  vigorously  that  the 
I55th  actually  did  halt  and  drop  down." 

Yours  truly, 

P.  H.  AIvIvABACH. 


COI,ONEI,  H.  H.  HUMPHREYS,  U.  S.  A. 
FORT  BUFORD,  D.  T. 

MY  DEAR  COI^GNEI,:  In  the  brochure  concerning  your  father  at 
Malvern  Hill  and  Fredericksburg,  Va.,  in  1862,  recently  printed  for 
private  distribution,  and  copies  of  which  were,  of  course,  sent  by  me  to 
Generals  Couch  and  Walker,  I  did  not  care  to  do  more  than  indicate 
what  appeared  to  me  to  be  weakness  and  fallacy  in  the  special  argument 
attempted  by  General  Walker  against  the  reports  of  General  Hum 
phreys.  Probably,  however,  it  would  have  been  better  had  I  gone  one 
step  further.  In  view  of  the  evidence,  there  cannot,  I  think,  be  any 
candid  doubt  as  to  the  correctness  and  the  moderation  of  General 
Humphreys'  reports  of  the  effect  of  the  prostrate  2d  Corps  line  upon 
his  charges.  Neither  do  I  think  that  his  statement  that  our  division 
reached  the  point  of  honor  nearest  to  the  stone  wall  will  be  doubted  by 
disinterested  minds,  in  view  of  the  arguments  adduced  by  General 
Walker.  What  insurance  company  wTould  ever  pay  out  a  dollar  on  such 
a  general  and  indefinite  identification  as  that  presented  as  conclusive  by 
General  Walker,  even  if  the  evidence  were  proffered  by  George  Wash 
ington  himself?  But,  even  if  the  identification  claimed  was  complete 
and  positive,  and  every  name  could  be  given  it  would  not  be  absolute 
proof  that  no  one  had  advanced  beyond  where  the  bodies  were  found. 
There  is  seldom  wanting  aid  to  help  a  wounded,  dying,  or  dead  comrade 
at  least  part  way  to  the  rear.  L"1  Audace  is  not  always  or  necessarily 
fatal.  Witness  your  father,  pre-eminently,  and  Colonels  Allabach, 
Clarke,  Gregory,  Allen,  O'Brien,  Rowe,  yourself,  and  many  others  on 
that  day.  It  needs  not  to  cite  instances  from  Cressy  or  Malplaquet,  from 
Leuthen  or  Jena,  from  Balaclava  or  Gettysburg,  or  from  any  other  field. 

But  General  Walker  has  set  the  matter  at  rest,  though  not  exactly  as 
he  had  evidently  intended.  On  page  173  of  2d  Corps  History  he  says: 

"  Caldwell's  men  gain  the  farthest  point  to  which  any  of  our  troops 
have  advanced;  a  few  of  them,  joined  by  some  choice  spirits  of  Kimball, 
Zook  and  Meagher,  actually  push  their  way  through  the  few  gaps  that 
have  been  torn  by  dying  hands  in  the  last  fence ',  and,  a  mere  handful, 
struggle  on  to  take  the  stone  wall  held  by  its  four  ranks  of  defenders. 
When  the  dead  of  that  bloody  field  were  buried,  all  the  way  from  the 
last  fence,  which  no  regiment  or  company  ever  passed  in  line,  up  to 
within  twenty  and  even  fifteen  yards  of  the  stone  wall,  lay  soldiers  of 
those  four  brigades. ' ' 


AT  FREDERICKSBURG,  VIRGINIA.  15 

My  impression  is  that,  if  General  Walker  had  examined  the  Official 
Records  a  little  more  carefully,  he  would  have  modified  this  statement 
which,  of  course,  definitely  and  undeniably  fixes  the  advance  of  the 
2d  Corps  troops  at  the  last  fence.  On  pages  440  and  441,  Vol.  XXI, 
O.  R.,  you  will  find  the  report  of  lyieut.  Col.  David  W.  Rowe,  One 
hundred  and  twenty-sixth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers.  Colonel  Rowe  says: 
"The  One  hundred  and  twenty-sixth  formed  behind  the  One  hundred 

and  thirty-fourth,  and  in  the  charge  followed  that  regiment 

Colonel  Elder  led,  on  horseback The  line  advanced,  in  as  good 

order  as  the  mud  would  permit,  at  double  quick,  until  they  unexpectedly 
came  upon  a  line  of  men  lying  on  the  ground,  who,  by  gestures  and 
words,  endeavored  to  warn  them  back.  This,  and  the  difficulty  of  pass 
ing  over  these  men,  created  some  confusion  in  the  ranks,  which  was 
increased  by  the  necessity  of  pulling  down,  or  scrambling  over  two 
fences  to  the  right  of  the  brick  house,  which  stood  in  front  of  the  rebel 

battery, Colonel  Elder,  who  had  dismounted  on  account  of  the 

fences,  fell,  wounded  in  the  thigh,  just  as  the  regiment  reached  its 

farthest  place  in  advance He  was  leading  his  horse  in  front  of 

his  own  regiment,  and  close  to  the  first  line,  when  he  fell." 

You  will  note  of  course,  that  the  line  of  this  regiment  was  disordered 
by  "pulling  down  or  scrambling  over'1'1  the  two  fences,  and  that  Colonel 
Elder,  after  dismounting  at  the  fences,  was  leading  (not  holding)  his 
horse  in  front  of  his  regiment,  having  advanced  beyond  the  fences,  and 
was  in  rear  of  the  first  line  which  was,  of  course,  still  farther  advanced, 
and  between  him  and  the  stone  wall.  Now,  in  view  of  General  Walker's 
statement  that  ' '  Caldwell  men  gain  the  farthest  point  to  which  any  of  our 
troops  have  advanced,"  and  that— to  his  knowledge  of  course — "no 
regiment  or  company  ever  passed  in  line  "  the  last  fence,  it  seems  to  me 
that  this  report  of  Colonel  Rowe  is  conclusive,  and  fully  bears  out  the 
report  of  Colonel  Edward  O'Brien,  commanding  the  One  hundred  and 
thirty-fourth  Penn.  Vols.  (Official  Records,  Vol.  XXI,  p.  443)  which 
formed  the  "first  line"  referred  to  by  Colonel  Rowe.  Colonel  O'Brien 
says:  "Although  the  attack  was  unsuccessful,  my  regiment  reached  a 
point  nearer  the  enemy'1  s  works  than  any  other,  as  our  dead  lying  close  by, 
fully  show."'1 

Colonel  Edgar  M.  Gregory,  commanding  the  Ninety-first  Penn.  Vols. 
and  in  the  second  line  of  the  brigade  formation — in  rear  of  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  twenty-ninth  regiment,  and  on  the  left  of  the  brick  house — 
states  in  his  report  (O.  R.  Vol.  XXI,  p.  439),  that  "The  advance  contin 
ued  beyond  the  brick  house,  about  30  or  40  yards,  when  we  retired,"  and, 
if  I  remember  correctly,  you,  yourself  were  a  witness  to  the  fact  that 
Colonel  Gregory's  horse  was  shot  from  under  him,  and  that  he,  himself 
was  wounded  when  in  front  of  the  then  dismantled  fence.  The  reports 
from  the  2d  Brigade  are  not  definite  as  to  points  reached  by  that 


1 6       MAJOR- GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

command,  but  we  know  that  they  passed  beyond  all  fences  in  their  way. 
I  do  not  see  what  further  evidence  is  needed.  Gallant  Corps  as  it  was, 
the  2d  Corps  troops  cannot  be  allowed  to  hold  the  laurels  won  by  our 
green  nine  months  Division  of  the  5th  Army  Corps. 

Very  truly  yours, 

(Signed),     CARS  WELL  McCLELLAX. 
218  Virginia  Avenue, 
St.  Paul,  Minn., 

December  6,  1886. 


BOSTON,  January  $th,  1889. 
CAPTAIN  H.  H.  HUMPHREYS, 

1 5th  Infantry,  Fort  Buford. 

DEAR  SIR: — Your  letter  of  October  2ist,  with  enclosures,  was  duly 
received,  and  I  immediately  set  about  a  reply  to  it;  but  the  very  great 
labors  connected  with  preparing  my  eulogy  on  General  Sheridan  rendered 
it  impossible  to  take  the  time  for  certain  correspondence  which  I  desired 
to  have  before  answering  your  letter.  No  sooner  was  the  eulogy  on 
Sheridan  delivered  than  I  was  obliged  to  prepare  my  address  as  President 
of  the  American  Economic  Association,  in  Philadelphia,  from  which  I 
liave  but  this  week  returned. 

I  regret  that  there  should  have  been  so  much  delay  in  replying  to 
your  communication;  yet  there  is,  after  all,  not  much  to  be  said  concern 
ing  its  subject  matter. 

I  never  asserted  that  no  man  of  the  2d  Corps  called  out  to  the 
troops  of  Humphreys'  Division,  on  the  I3th  of  December,  1862,  that  it 
was  useless  to  go  forward  against  the  stone  wall.  What  I  did  say  was  as 
follows:  "It  is  very  likely  true  that  among  those  thousands,  a  few  may 
have  called  out  to  Allabach's  and  Tyler's  men  that,  it  was  useless  to  go 
forward;  but  their  own  situation,  on  that  plain,  swept  by  fire,  is  proof 
enough  that  such  men  were  very  few,  if  indeed,  the  story  is  not  the  tale 
of  some  colonel  or  captain  to  excuse  the  breaking  of  his  own  command." 
Shortly  after  the  issue  of  my  work  you  wrote  me  that  you  yourself  had 
heard  these  expressions  on  the  occasion  in  question,  and  that  you  would 
collect  further  testimony  on  the  subject. 

To  this  I  replied  that  your  assurance  was  sufficient,  and  that  my 
publishers  would  be  instructed  to  omit  the  last  twenty-one  words  in 
future  editions. 

The  remainder  of  the  sentence  quoted  above  I  see  no  reason  to 
change.  The  opinion  expressed  therein  is  entirely  compatible  with  the 
statement  of  officers  and  men  of  the  I3ist  Penn.,  which  you  enclose  in 
your  letter.  All  of  these  might  have  possibly  heard  the  same  outcry 
from  a  single  individual,  though,  if  each  of  them  had  heard  a  different 


AT  FREDERICKSBURG,  VIRGINIA.  17 

member  of  the  2d  Corps  say  the  same  thing,  my  remark  would  still  be 
true,  so  far  as  this  body  of  testimony  goes.  A  dozen,  or,  for  that  matter, 
a  hundred,  would  be  "very  few"  among  the  thousands  of  officers  and 
men  of  the  2d  Corps  who  lay  on  the  ground  before  the  stone  wall,  that 
bloody  afternoon. 

But,  after  all,  it  is  a  matter  of  very  little  consequence  whether  more 
or  fewer  of  the  men  of  the  2d  Corps  did  use  such  expressions  as  you 
have  cited.  The  essential  question  is  whether  the  charge  of  Humphreys' 
Division  failed  because  of  the  presence  of  Couch's  troops,  or  because  of 
the  four  ranks  of  veteran  riflemen  who,  in  the  words  of  your  honored 
father,  made  the  stone  wall  "a  sheet  of  flame  that  enveloped  the  head 
and  flanks  of  the  column."  To  me,  certainly,  it  would  appear  more 
creditable  to  the  discipline  and  courage  of  Humphreys'  men  to  attribute 
their  failure  to  the  latter  than  the  former  cause;  and,  since  to  assign  the 
former  cause  is  to  reflect  upon  a  body  of  troops  for  whom  it  is  my  duty 
to  speak,  and  who,  as  I  believe,  were  never  surpassed  in  loyal  and  heroic 
devotion  by  any  corps  ever  mustered  upon  the  face  of  the  earth,  I  must 
take  the  liberty  to  retain  and  repeat  my  belief  that  Humphreys'  Division 
failed  to  carry  the  Confederate  position  for  the  same  reason  which  had 
defeated  the  supreme  efforts  of  the  magnificent  divisions  of  French, 
Hancock  and  Howard. 

One  thing  remains  to  be  said  on  this  point.  General  Humphreys 
knew  of  the  presence  of  the  troops  of  the  2d  Corps  upon  the  ground 
over  which  he  was  to  charge  before  his  advance  had  been  ordered;  yet 
he  did  not,  as  I  am  informed  by  General  Couch,  intimate  any  desire  that 
they  should  be  withdrawn.  This  appears  to  me  to  have  constituted  an 
acceptance  of  the  situation  which  should  preclude  any  adverse  reflec 
tions,  in  the  interest  of  Humphreys'  Division,  upon  the  gallant  men  who 
were  lying  upon  that  blood-stained  ground,  at  an  instant  peril  of  the  life 
of  every  one  of  them  and  at  the  actual  sacrifice  of  the  lives  of  hundreds. 

2d.  As  to  the  remaining  question,  whether  the  men  of  Humphreys' 
Division  went  that  day  nearer  to  the  stone  wall  than  the  men  of  the 
2d  Corps,  you  must  excuse  me  for  saying  that  the  evidence  you  present 
does  not,  in  my  humble  opinion,  create  even  a  presumption  in  favor  of 
your  position. 

In  the  first  place  the  question  is  not,  whether  on  the  immediate  lines 
of  Allabach's  or  Tyler's  advance,  the  troops  of  the  2d  Corps  went 
nearer  the  stone  wall  than  those  brigades  did.  The  ground  over  which 
the  divisions  of  French,  Hancock  and  Howard  charged,  first  or  last,  was 
far  wider  than  that  covered  by  the  charges  of  Allabach  and  Tyler.  It 
might,  therefore,  be  true  that  no  troops  went  further  forward  than  the 
latter  brigades  upon  their  own  ground,  and  yet  it  might  be  true  that  at 
other  points  some  of  the  men  of  the  2d  Corps  went  even  nearer  still  to 
the  stone  wall. 


1 8  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

In  the  second  place,  the  evidence  offered  to  prove  that  no  troops  had 
gone  in  advance  of  Allabach's  and  Tyler's  men,  along  their  lines  of 
advance  is  altogether  inconclusive.  It  is  proverbially  hard  to  prove  a 
negative;  yet  the  only  testimony  offered  in  this  case  is  that  of  certain 
officers  and  men  who  did  not  see  any  dead  bodies  over  the  ground  over 
which  they  advanced  in  the  latter  part  of  their  charge.  Had  these 
witnesses  gone  upon  a  peaceful  field,  searching  undisturbed  for  dead 
bodies  their  report  might  have  been  of  some  value  on  the  subject.  In 
the  case,  however,  of  men  rushing  forward  in  all  the  fury  and  excite 
ment  of  a  most  desperate  charge,  against  a  hostile  position  which  was 
one  sheet  of  flame  from  end  to  end,  a  failure  to  note  the  presence  of  dead 
bodies,  had  they  lain  there  in  considerable  numbers,  would  have  been 
the  most  natural  thing  in  the  world.  When  men's  attention  is  strongly 
fixed  in  a  certain  direction,  almost  anything  else  may  occur  without  their 
noticing  it.  This  is  the  entire  secret  of  the  art  of  the  sleight-of-hand 
performer.  In  the  presence  of  a  thousand  persons  he  will  do  things 
which  not  one  of  them  observes,  because  he  has  first  concentrated  their 
attention  and  fixed  it  upon  something  else.  I  have  myself  rode  for 
hours  in  the  midst  of  a  bloody  battle  without  seeing  a  man  fall  from  the 
ranks,  or  a  body  lying  upon  the  ground,  simply  because  my  attention 
was  fixed  upon  the  general  movements  in  progress  and  my  faculties 
utterly  engrossed  by  important  duties.  If  this  might  be  the  case  in  a 
protracted  action,  during  portions  of  which  the  hostile  lines  were  at  a 
considerable  distance  from  each  other,  how  much  more  might  it  be  true 
of  any  soldier,  even  the  bravest  and  the  coolest,  during  such  a  furious 
rush  as  that  which  wras  so  gallantly  but  ineffectually  made  by  Humphreys' 
Brigades  on  the  afternoon  of  the  i3th  of  December. 

3d.  So  much  for  the  negative  testimony  on  the  subject.  The 
positive  evidence  stands  in  this  way.  Neither  General  Humphreys  nor 
yourself  nor  any  officer  or  soldier  of  that  division,  so  far  as  it  appears  by 
the  records,  witnessed  any  one  of  the  charges  made  by  the  2d  Corps 
against  the  stone  wall.  On  the  other  hand,  thousands  of  officers  and 
men  witnessed  alike  the  charges  of  Humphreys'  Division  and  those  made 
from  the  divisions  of  French,  Hancock  and  Howard.  I  have  yet  to  learn 
of  a  single  person  who  enjoyed  those  opportunities  who  holds  with  you. 

Such  is  my  case.  This  is  all  I  have  to  say  on  the  subject.  If  your 
mind  is  not  satisfied,  I  do  not  see  but  what  we  shall  have  to  agree  to  dis 
agree  regarding  this  matter  as  men  have  to  do  respecting  many  other 
points,  in  this  and  every  other  war  in  human  history.  I  venture  respect 
fully  to  suggest,  however,  that  the  least  effectual  way  of  exalting  the  honor 
of  any  one  body  of  gallant  troops  is  through  disparaging  others,  which 
have  proven,  through  two  score  of  desperate  battles,  their  claim  to  con 
sideration  and  respect.  Whatever  may  be  written,  I,  for  one,  entertain 
no  fear  that  any  intelligent  and  disinterested  American  will  believe  the 


AT  FREDERICKSBURG,  VIRGINIA.  19 

divisions  of  French,  Hancock  and  Howard  to  have  been  inferior  in 
courage,  discipline  and  efficiency  to  the  gallant  regiments  that  composed 
the  brigades  of  Allabach  and  Tyler. 

I  will  only  ask  that  should  you  feel  it  your  duty  to  publish  anything 
on  this  subject  you  will  do  me  the  great  courtesy  and  favor  to  call  my 
attention  thereto. 

Respectfully  yours, 

(Signed),     FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 


1 6 1 6  2  IST  STREET, 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  April  i -6,  1890. 
GENERAL  F.  A.  WALKER, 
BOSTON,  MASS. 

DEAR  SIR: — Your  letter  of  January  5th,  1889,  it  is  believed  was 
acknowledged  soon  after  its  receipt.  From  that  time  on  the  published 
official  reports  of  those  engaged  on  both  sides  in  the  battle  of  Fredericks- 
burg  have  been  consulted,  the  battleground  visited  and  carefully  gone 
over,  memory  refreshed  by  conversation  with  individuals  of  both  sides, 
who  gave  and  received  blowTs  in  that  memorable  action.  You  are  right  in 
stating  "The  essential  question  is  whether  the  charge  of  Humphreys' 
Division  failed  because  of  the  presence  of  Couchs'  troops,  or  because  of 
the  four  ranks  of  veteran  riflemen  who,  in  the  words  of  your  honored 
father  made  the  stone  wall  a  sheet  of  flame  that  enveloped  the  head  and 
flanks  of  the  column."  In  reply,  I  submit  the  reflections,  as  you  style 
my  communication  to  you,  came  first  from  yourself  and  not  from  me. 
Far-be  it  I  should  detract  one  iota  from  the  noble  deeds  performed  by  the 
2d  Corps,  whose  actions  have  been  written  in  blood. 

It  is  to  you  I  address  myself  who,  dwelling  on  the  deeds  of  this  noble 
band,  have  been  led  to  believe  such  sayings  essentially  as  follows,  wre  got 
to  within  25  and  20  yards  of  the  stone  wall,  no  troops  went  farther  to  the 
front  than  we,  and  accepting  them  without  contradiction,  have  overlooked 
the  claims  of  others  equally  as  brave,  I  will  not. say  braver. 

How  can  I  remain  silent  when  such  assertions  coming  from  one  hold 
ing  the  position  you  do,  carries  with  it  for  a  class  of  persons  a  weight  who, 
allowing  others  to  do  their  thinking,  fail  to  search  for  themselves. 

The  3d  Division,  5th  Corps,  were  green  troops,  never  before  under 
fire  as  a  Division.  Such  troops  led  by  a  gallant  General  go  farther  than 
veterans.  They  do  not  know  the  peril  of  their  position,  neither  has  the 
value  of  a  cross  fire  of  artillery,  accentuated  by  that  of  infantry  terrors 
for  them ;  onward  they  press  after  their  leader.  History  contains  many 
examples  of  such  deeds.  It  is  needless  to  refer  to  them. 


20  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

As  to  the  removal  of  Couchs'  troops  who,  occupying  the  ground,  were 
an  impediment  to  a  successful  home  thrust  by  the  3d  Division,  5th 
Corps,  permit  me  to  remark  it  was  essential  to  the  success  of  the  attack 
to  be  delivered  by  this  Division,  that  the  ground  should  have  been  cleared 
of  all  retarders. 

The  orders  under  which  General  Humphreys  acted,  did  not  permit 
making  a  survey  of  the  ground  over  which  the  charges  was  made,  neither 
did  time  permit  of  his  so  doing.  Had  circumstances  permitted  such 
survey,  General  Humphreys  would  have  demanded  as  of  primary  import 
ance  to  the  success  of  his  charges,  the  removal  from  the  ground  of  all 
troops  then  occupying  that  portion  over  which  the  division  moved. 
Possibly  had  time  permitted  for  granting  such  a  demand,  it  would  not  have 
been  complied  with  by  General  Couch,  who,  fearing  such  a  withdrawal 
would  cause  the  Confederate  troops  to  leave  their  position,  and  deliver  a 
counter  stroke,  forgot  Union  troops  posted  to  right  and  left  could  and 
would  have  poured  on  them  a  flanking  fire;  granting  such  a  contingency 
to  have  taken  place  it  would  have  given  us  the  victory.  The  Confederate 
troops  knew  full  well  the  value  of  their  position. 

A  few  more  men  (relatively  speaking),  would  have  been  killed  and 
wounded  in  the  withdrawal;  what  did  that  matter,  if  by  so  doing  the 
stone  wall  was  carried,  as  it  would  have  been  by  the  green  division  of  the 
5th  Corps  led  by  General  Humphreys.  The  demand  "the  carrying  of 
the  stonewall  before  dark"  was  imperative,  the  response  well  known. 
Ivet  me  be  understood;  General  Humphreys  was  not  aware,  did  not  know 
when  orders  were  received  by  him  to  make  this  charge,  of  the  ground 
being  encumbered  by  troops,  neither  did  his  order  permit  him  of  doing 
aught  but  form  and  charge.  General  Couch  had  been  on  the  ground  a 
long  time,  knew  another  charge  was  to  be  made,  and  should  have  assisted 
by  all  means  in  his  power  to  render  this  attack  a  success.  What  did  he 
do?  All  entreaties  on  the  part  of  the  men  of  the  3d  Division,  5th  Corps, 
to  those  of  the  2d  Corps  lying  on  the  ground  to  rise  and  go  forward  with 
them,  wrere  of  no  avail.  Had  they  done  so,  the  stone  wall  would  have 
been  carried,  and  this  success  shared  by  both  commands.  I  believe  one 
Officer  of  the  2d  Corps,  seeing  this  advantage,  called  on  his  men  to 
go  forward,  set  the  example,  but  they  remained  immovable. 

Your  second  reply  begs  the  question  as  to  nearness  of  the  men  of 
2d  Corps  to  the  stone  wall.  Your  history  of  same  asserts  for  them  that 
fact.  A  careful  reading  of  the  Rebellion  records,  confirms  my  opinion , 
the  3d  Division,  5th  Corps,  was  formed  in  rear  of  ground  held  by  Cald- 
well,  Zook,  and  others  of  the  2d  Corps.  Muskets  were  rung  unloaded, 
bayonets  fixed,  and  the  Division  charged  over  them.  Wherein  does  the 
Clio  of  this  war  make  mention  of  such  small  things,  their  very  nature 
showing  grim  determination,  wherein  does  she  speak  of  a  division  led  by 
its  commander  into  the  jaws  of  death.  Sir,  the  North,  the  whole  army, 


AT  FREDERICKSBURG,  VIRGINIA.  21 

moved  with  admiration  by  this  act  of  heroism,  rang  with  applause.  It  is 
unparalleled,  unprecedented,  unexcelled,  and  to  this  day  stands  a  shining 
example  of  what  one  man  can  do,  has  done;  a  man  so  modest,  so 
generous,  so  careful  of  the  feelings  of  others,  never  speaking  of  himself. 

Thus  we  have  narrowed  somewhat  the  front,  and  bring  the  Division 
on  the  same  ground  held  by  the  gentlemen  who  claim  no  troops  passed 
beyond  their  lines  or  approached  nearer  the  stone  wall. 

I  bring  this  forward  to  prove  my  assertions,  and  here  I  stand  not 
alone,  no  men  dead  or  wounded  belonging  to  the  2d  Corps  were  seen  by 
me  lying  on  the  ground  in  front  of  the  line  of  the  3d  Division,  5th  Corps, 
when  at  its  farthest  point  forward. 

General  Humphreys  and  myself,  mounted,  were  in  front  of  this 
line.  To  this  day  this  ground,  bare  of  men,  has  remained  indelibly  fixed 
on  my  mind,  as  I,  with  others  at  that  time,  occupied  a  point  of  vantage 
not  enjoyed  by  others,  save  those  whom  I  accompanied.  Your  reference 
to  the  sleight-of-hand  performer  is  very  true  of  jugglery,  but  incom 
patible  with  our  present  subject. 

To  your  third  reply.  The  official  report  of  Brigadier  General  B. 
Kershaw,  commanding  troops  of  Confederate  Army  at  stone  wall,  states: 
"At  5  P.  M.,  the  most  formidable  column  of  attack  was  formed,  some  few, 
chiefly  officers,  got  within  thirty  yards  or  less  of  the  stone  wall." 

Major-General  L.  McLaws,  Confederate  Army,  commanding  at  same 
place,  official  report,  states  as  follows:  "At  about  4:30  P.M.  the  enemy 
in  the  meanwhile  formed  a  strong  column  of  attack,  and  advancing 
under  cover  of  the  artillery  fire,  came  forward  along  our  whole  front  in 
the  most  determined  manner." 

You  will  not  deny  these  officers  being  good  judges  of  what  they  saw 
and  described.  They  witnessed  all  the  charges  made  upon  their  position 
by  the  2d  Corps,  yet  nowhere  do  they  employ  such  emphatic  language 
when  speaking  of  previous  charges  on  their  position,  except  of  the  last 
one,  that  delivered  by  General  Humphreys.  An  officer,  then  holding 
high*  rank  in  the  Confederate  Army,  occupying  a  position  from  which 
a  good  view  was  obtained  of  the  ground  struggled  over,  gives  as  his 
decided  opinion,  the  troops  of  the  3d  division,  5th  Corps,  advanced 
farther  and  nearer  the  stone  wall  than  any  other.  At  no  late  date  I  trust 
to  submit  for  your  information  a  copy  of  the  letter  embodying  his  views. 

General  de  Trobriand,  in  his  four  years  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  states:  "  The  head  of  General  Humphreys'  column  reached  a 
point  about  fifteen  or  twenty  paces  from  the  stone  wall." 

I  quote  from  Major  General  de  Peyster,  of  New  York  City,  one  well 
versed  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  this  war:  "  The  experienced  French 
General  of  Brigade,  V.  de  Chanel,  in  reporting  to  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
III. ,  remarks  as  follows  of  Humphreys  at  Fredericksburg  " :  '  These  poor 

*The  writer  was  mistaken  as  to  the  rank. 


22  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

fellows  disheartened  by  several  charges,  and  thinking  perhaps  as  well  of 
their  liberation  so  near  at  hand,  have  laid  down  and  continued  deaf  to 
the  threats,  as  well  as  to  the  entreaties  of  their  Commander.  Then 
Humphreys  dismounted  and  accompanied  by  his  son,  a  youth  of  sixteen, 
who  never  left  his  father's  side,  advanced  slowly  toward  the  enemy. 
The  Pennsylvanians,  shamed  by  this  example,  started  to  their  feet  and 
rushed  to  the  attack.  The  first  surge  up  the  slippery  slope  was  made  by 
French,  3d  Division,  2d  Corps,  with  a  boldness  and  backbone  that 
carried  his  first  line  to  within  thirty  or  forty  paces  of  the  never  to  be 
forgotten  Ha!  Ha!  stone  wall.  The  second  surge  forward  \vas  made  by 
Hancock,  ist  Division,  2d  Corps.  It  broke  within  twenty-five  paces  of 
the  stone  wall.  As  to  Humphreys'  Division.  As  it  was,  despite  his 
utmost  endeavors,  in  which  two  horses  were  shot  under  him,  and  another 
badly  wounded,  he  could  not  get  his  division  across  that  stone  wall, 
indeed  not  nearer  than  fifteen  or  twenty  paces  to  it.  Although  they 
reached  the  point  nearest  to  it  which  had  been  obtained  they  were  com 
pelled  to  retire.'  " 

*-jt#-jt#**#* 

"His  division,  like  the  third  breaker  upon  the  beach,  left  traces  of 
blood  and  wrecks,  a  few  paces  farther  on  and  nearer  to  the  enemy  than 
the  preceding  two,  lingered  longer,  strove  harder  to  maintain  itself  so 
far  and  to  accomplish  the  impossible. ' ' 

Again  I  quote  from  the  same  authority:  "  Indeed  so  near  was  he 
to  carrying  the  wall  and  heights  that  the  enemy  were  actually  moving 
their  guns  out  of  the  batteries,  and  on  the  right  they  were  beginning  to 
quit  the  wall. ' ' 

See  letter  of  Humphreys  to  William  Swinton,  May  loth,  1886:  "A 
gentleman  of  this  city,  Mr.  Kirby,  'The  boy  scout,'  with  whom  I  have 
conversed,  gives,  as  his  opinion,  based  upon  what  survivors  of  the  Con 
federate  Army  (some  residents  of  Fredericksburg,  Va.)  have  said  to  him. 
They  (the  Confederates)  concede  to  Humphreys  the  nearest  approach  to 
the  stone  wall." 

It  is  inferred,  the  "  History  of  the  2d  Corps  "  strengthens  its  case  upon 
w7hat  was  said  by  an  officer  of  that  corps  who  went  over  under  a  flag  of 
truce  with  detail  to  bury  the  dead.  It  has  been  affirmed  by  Martha 
Stevens,  since  dead  (in  front  of  whose  house  General  Cobb,  commanding 
at  stone  wall,  was  mortally  wounded),  in  language  nearly  as  follows: 
"  The  field  was  blue  in  color  before  the  Union  troops  left;  next  morning 
it  was  white."  Here  the  dead  lay  for  some  days  before  burial,  stripped 
of  all  clothing  and  exposed  to  the  vicissitudes  of  climate.  How  was 
recognition  effected  when  everything  tending  towards  that  had  been 
removed?  Were  the  bodies  of  the  Union  soldiers,  then  lying  there,  so 
well  known  to  the  detail,  that  the  changes  wrought  upon  their  features 
by  weather  made  no  difference?  I  doubt  it.  The  Maltese  Cross,  the 


AT  FREDERICKS  BURG,  VIRGINIA.  23 

Trefoil,  and  other  symbols  marking  the  several  corps,  were  of  subsequent 
origin  to  this  action,  excepting  in  one  division  (Kearney)  the  red 
diamond  of  the  3d  Corps. 

Still  further,  when  the  brigade  of  Allabach  (2d  of  3d  Division,  5th 
Corps)  was  broken  by  the  fire  from  the  stone  wall,  many  men  of  this 
command  ran  forward  to  this  house  (Martha  Stevens)  and  remained 
there  until  night  fall.  This  house  is  less  than  twenty  yards  from  the 
stone  wall  by  actual  measurement. 

Colonel  Allabach,  commanding  2d  Brigade,  3d  Division,  5th  Corps, 
official  report  is  as  follows:  "  My  troops  reached  within  twelve  yards  of 
the  stone  wall."  This  officer  is  a  veteran  of  two  wars. 

Your  "  History  of  2d  Corps  "  claims  the  last  fence,  official  reports  of 
officers  commanding  regiments  in  3d  Division,  5th  Corps,  state:  The 
line  advanced  in  as  good  order  as  the  mud  would  permit  at  double  quick, 
until  they  unexpectedly  came  upon  a  line  of  men  lying  on  the  ground, 
who  by  gestures  and  words  endeavored  to  keep  them  back.  This,  and 
the  difficulty  of  passing  over  the  men  created  some  confusion  in  the 
ranks,  which  was  increased  by  the  necessity  of  pulling  down  and 
scrambling  over  two  fences."  These  fences  were  to  the  right  and  front 
of  brick  house  standing  in  the  field,  used  as  a  hospital.  It  is  there  yet. 

Lastly,  were  General  Humphreys  living,  he  would  have  pointed  out 
wherein  you  were  wrong,  and  on  his  statements  you  would  have 
corrected  the  errors  committed.  Due  regard  for  those  whose  lips  are 
sealed  by  death,  coupled  with  admiration  for  the  green  division,  has 
called  forth  this  letter. 

With  these  official  statements,  coupled  with  my  own  recollections, 
the  extracts  and  statements  from  others,  together  with  the  official  report 
of  General  Humphreys,  I  claim  for  the  3d  Division,  5th  Corps,  the 
nearest  approach  to  the  stone  wall,  and  shall  so  maintain,  reserving  to 
myself  the  right  to  publish  as  you  have  done,  my  views  on  this  disputed 
matter. 

Thanking  you  for  the  correction  to  be  made  in  any  future  edition  of 
the  "  History  of  the  2d  Corps." 

I  am,  Sir,  respectfully, 
(Signed),     HENRY  H.  HUMPHREYS, 

Captain  isth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A. 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  June  16,  1891. 

DEAR  CAPT.  HUMPHREYS:— Pardon  my  delay  in  not  replying  to 
your  letter  until  to-day. 

My  recollection  of  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  in  which  I  was  an 
humble  participant,  is  as  follows: 


24  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

The  Richmond  Fayette  Artillery  (a  six  gun  battery),  of  which  I  was 
an  officer,  was  attached  to  General  McLaws'  Division  during  the  fall  and 
winter  of  1862,  and  which  was  one  of  the  first  divisions  to  reach  the  hills 
in  rear  of  Fredericksburg,  on  or  about  the  iyth  of  November,  1862.  I 
believe  about  one  day  ahead  of  the  Federal  troops.  On  the  nth  day  of 
December,  1862,  we  were  placed  in  position  in  General  Lee's  line  of 
battle,  near  the  telegraph  road,  on  a  commanding  hill  which  overlooked 
the  whole  town  and  the  plains  below  and  along  the  Rappahannock  river; 
we  were  also  in  close  proximity  to  Marye's  Heights,  Generals  Lee  and 
Longstreet,  with  their  Staffs  occupied  a  position  near  our  battery  to  watch 
the  progress  of  the  battle.  Our  guns  were  intended  to  rake  the  fields 
and  the  old  sunken  railroad  cut  in  our  front.  On  our  left  and  down  in 
front  of  Marye's  Hill  ran  the  telegraph  road;  this  road  was  about  four 
feet  below  the  level  of  the  land  on  the  side  near  the  town,  while  on  the 
other  side  arose  Marye's  Heights,  a  splendid  natural  fortification  for  any 
body  of  troops  to  resist  the  advance  of  an  approaching  enemy.  In  this 
sunken  road  were  placed  General  Tom  Cobb's  and  one  other  Brigade  of 
McLaws'  Division. 

On  this  day,  nth  of  December,  1862,  the  town  of  Fredericksburg 
was  shelled,  driving  out  all  the  inhabitants.  On  December  15,  1862,  the 
great  battle  was  fought;  from  our  position  we  could  plainly  see  the  whole 
line  of  battle.  I  saw  the  three  grand  but  desperate  and  unsuccessful 
assaults  that  were  made  upon  the  sunken  road  in  front  and  at  the  foot  of 
Marye's  Heights.  The  first  attack  was  made  just  after  the  repulse  of 
General  Franklin  on  our  right,  and  which,  I  believe,  was  General 
French's  Division,  after  a  fierce  struggle  over  many  obstacles  this  divi 
sion  retreated  with  heavy  loss.  The  second  charge  was  made  almost 
immediately  after  the  repulse  of  the  first;  the  troops  in  this  charge  were 
of  General  Hancock's  Division.  Both  of  these  assaults  were  made  more 
to  our  left  and  immediately  in  front  of  Marye's  Heights,  and  in  conse 
quence  were  farther  from  our  position,  so  that  we  took  little  or  no  part 
in  these  two  assaults. 

The  third  or  last  assault  was  made  near  sunset  and  came  closer  and 
nearer  to  our  works  than  the  first  two.  The  troops  in  this  charge  were 
of  Gen.  A.  A.  Humphreys'  Division;  they  were  handled  in  a  most  mas 
terly  manner  and  were  pressed  forward  with  vigor  and  determination  to 
capture  the  works  at  the  foot  of  Marye's  Heights  and  the  telegraph  road; 
as  the  troops  of  this  last  assault  emerged  from  the  railroad  cut  and  formed 
line  for  the  charge  our  guns  opened  upon  them  with  good  effect,  but  with 
this  galling  and  disastrous  fire  in  their  front  they  came  forward  in  a  rush, 
nearly  reaching  the  telegraph  road  and  the  walks  under  the  hill;  it  was 
with  difficulty  that  Cobb's  and  Cook's  Brigades  could  hold  their  positions 
during  this  assault. 


AT  FREDERICKSBURG,  VIRGINIA.    '  25 

General  Humphreys'  Division  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss,  perhaps 
more  so  than  the  other  two  divisions  from  the  fact  that  he  pressed  his 
troops  closer  and  harder  in  the  attack.  We  lost  many  valuable  officers 
and  men  in  the  assault. 

I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  if  General  Humphreys'  Division  had 
attacked  our  line  a  little  more  to  our  right  (your  left)  he  would  undoubt 
edly  have  avoided  a  greater  portion  of  the  sunken  road  and  the  fire  from 
our  batteries  on  Marye's  Heights,  and  no  doubt  would  have  captured  a 
part  of  the  telegraph  road,  there  being  but  two  brigades  behind  the  stone 
wall,  but  it  would  not  have  been  possible  for  any  body  of  troops  to  have 
gone  any  farther,  no  matter  how  brave  they  may  have  been,  or  how 
skillfully  handled.  A  day  or  two  after  the  battle  I  went  out  with  the  flag 
of  truce  between  the  lines  to  see  about  burying  the  dead,  but  more  especi 
ally  to  find  the  body  of  Captain  King,  who  waspn  General  McLaws'  Staff, 
and  was  killed  during  the  last  assault.  I  saw  the  dead  as  they  had  fallen 
in  these  charges,  and  while  I  do  not  wish  to  detract  anything  from  the 
hard  fought  but  bloody  battle  in  which  they  had  been  repulsed,  yet,  I 
must  in  justice  say  that  the  dead  bodies  that  I  saw  close  to  our  works 
belonged  to  General  Humphreys'  Division. 

I  have  written  this  letter  hastily  and  without  much  thought, 
endeavoring  to  give  you  my  recollection  in  as  brief  a  form  as  possible 
(without  referring  to  documents)  of  what  occurred  at  the  Battle  of 
Fredericksburg,  December  15,  1862. 

Very  truly  yours, 

(Signed),     ROB'T  I.  FLEMING. 


1bumpbre\>8'  Charge  at 


THE  circumstances  of  Humphreys'  assault  deserves  fuller 
mention  that  I  have  made,  for  the  charge  was  marked  by 
a  gallantry  unsurpassed  by  anything  in  the  history  of  the 
war.  General  Palfrey  in  his  admirable  monograph  on  Fred- 
ericksburg  (in  Scribner's  '  '  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War'  '  series) 
says:  —  "Some  of  the  very  best  righting  that  was  done  at 
Fredericksburg  was  done  by  the  3d  Division  of  the  5th  Corps. 
The  Division  was  commanded  by  General  Humphreys,  who 
was  probably  the  best  Officer  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
that  day.  He  was  a  thoroughly  educated  soldier,  possessed  of 
a  quick  eye  and  a  clear  head,  and  a  man  of  fiery  energy.  That 
the  fighting  his  division  did  was  so  good  was  due  to  him. 

I  venture  to  extract  from  a  private  letter  from  General 
Humphreys  to  the  present  writer  dated  May  10,  1866,  the 
following  particulars,  which  give  an  even  more  vivid  picture  of 
his  assault  than  is  found  in  his  official  report: 

"I  had  just  reached  the  edge  of  the  town  facing  Marye's 
Heights  with  my  division,  when,  at  the  earnest  request  of 
General  Couch,  I  was  authorized  or  ordered  to  support  his 
troops  in  front  of  the  stone  wall,  who,  he  said,  were  nearly  out 
of  ammunition  and  would,  if  not  supported,  be  forced  back. 

'  '  This  was  a  very  great  mistake.  Had  the  enemy  come  out 
from  the  stone  wall,  we  should  have  carried  the  position.  I 
moved  forward  at  once  with  my  division  down  the  hill  and 
across  the  ditch  or  canal,  formed  the  leading  brigade  in  the 
ravine  beyond  the  ditch  about  three  or  four  hundred  yards 
from  the  stone  wall  and  advanced  in  line  of  battle  to  where 
Couch's  men  were  lying  behind  a  small  fold  in  the  ground 
about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  or  less  from  the  stone 

27 


28  MAJOR- GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS' 

wall,  the  existence  of  which  I  knew  nothing  of  until  I  got 
there.  I  saw  at  once  that  there  was  nothing  to  be  done  but 
to  try  the  bayonet,  which  I  attempted  with  this  brigade,  but 
could  not  carry  the  wall  chiefly  because  my  troops  were 
thrown  into  disorder  by  the  men  lying,  several  ranks  deep, 
behind  the  little  fold  in  the  ground  I  have  already  men 
tioned.  I  had  ordered  my  other  brigade  to  form  in  the  same 
ravine  as  it  came  up,  and  move  up  to  me,  and  now  rode  back 
towards  it.  It  was  at  this  time  I  found  the  artillery  Hooker 
had  put  on  the  edge  of  the  ravine,  just  in  the  very  ground  my 
troops  must  pass  over.  I  was  obliged  to  go  to  every  gun  myself 
to  put  a  stop  to  their  firing.*  I  then  led  forward  my  other 
brigade,  which  was  thrown  into  confusion  by  the  masses  of  men 
lying  down  at  the  place  I  have  already  mentioned,  the  little  fold 
in  the  ground.  I  had  cautioned  my  troops  about  these  men, 
and  told  them  not  to  mind  them,  but  to  run  over  them.  But 
the  brigade  was  thrown  into  an  unwieldy  mass  in  going  over 
or  through  them,  and  the  officers  and  men  were  mixed  up 
so  that  the  former  lost  all  control  of  the  latter.  Notwithstand 
ing  this,  the  impetus  with  which  they  were  moving  carried  them 
close  up  to  the  wall, f  the  right  being  actually  on  it,  and  the  left 
nearer  to  the  wall  than  any  other  troops  had  reached,  when 
some  firing  began  in  the  column  or  mass,  which  halted  and 
turned  slowly  back.  One  minute  more  and  we  should  have 
been  over  the  wall,  which  I  am  confident  I  should  have  carried 
but  for  the  disorder  occasioned  by  the  troops  lying  down  whom 
I  was  sent  to  support.  If  they  had  been  withdrawn  before  I 
moved  forward  a  different  result  would  have  followed.  I 
tried  to  get  them  up  to  make  them  charge  with  me,  but  could 
not  stir  them.  I  stopped  their  firing,  however.  Every  officer 
of  my  Staff  but  one  was  dismounted,  and  his  horse  was  badly 
wounded.  Four  of  my  Staff  were  wounded.  I  lost  two 
horses.  So  near  was  I  to  carrying  the  wall  and  heights 
that  the  enemy  were  actually  moving  the  guns  out  of  the 

*In  the  book  from  which  I  copy  this  letter  there  is  a  foot  note  at  this  place,  which 
however,  I  have  not  copied,  as  it  is  rather  long  and  seems  to  be  unimportant. 

tOn  the  printed  page  from  which  I  copy  this,  there  is  no  comma  in  this  sentence 
until  this  place.     I  have  copied  throughout  the  punctuation  of  the  printed  page. 


CHARGE  AT  MARYK'S  HEIGHTS.  29 

batteries,  and  near  our  right  they  were  beginning  to  quit 
the  wall.  It  was  getting  to  be  dark  when  the  charge  was 
over.  It  was  when  I  was  returning  to  lead  my  last  brigade 
to  the  charge  that  I  received  messages  for  the  first  time 
from  General  Hooker  and  from  General  Butterfield  saying 
that  General  Burnside  said  the  heights  must  be  taken  before 
night.  I  sent  them  word  I  had  tried  the  bayonet  with  one 
brigade,  and  was  now  going  to  try  it  with  the  other. 
General  Hooker  and  General  Butterfield  had  returned  from 
General  Burnside  while  I  was  occupied  with  my  leading  brigade 
and  the  former  mistook  the  charge  of  the  second  brigade  for 
the  charge  of  my  division,  hence  the  error  of  his  testimony. 
I  wrent  over  the  ground  on  my  march  to  Washington  in  May  of 
last  year,  and  found  that  the  distances  were  even  less  than 
those  I  gave  in  my  official  report  of  the  part  taken  in  the  battle 
by  my  division.  The  first  brigade  that  charged  was  commanded 
by  Colonel  Allabach.  The  second  was  commanded  by  Brigadier 
General  E.  B.  Tyler." 

Copied  from  William  Swinton's  "Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac." 
(Scribner's,  1882).  Appendix,  page  633.  (Signed),  H.  E.  B. 

Received  at  Fort  Sheridan,  Illinois,  March  8,  1894.  (Signed),  Henry  H. 
Humphreys,  U.  S.  A. 


1018  i2TH  STREET, 

N.  W.,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C., 

March  i?th,  1896. 
CAPTAIN  HENRY  H.  HUMPHREYS, 

U.  S.  ARMY, 

FORT  SHERIDAN  ILLINOIS. 

DEAR  SIR:  Business  matters  have  prevented  me  from  replying  to 
your  letter  of  February  2oth,  1896,  until  now. 

In  answer  to  your  question  in  relation  to  the  dead  in  front  of  Mayre's 
Heights  at  the  Battle  of  Fredericksburg,  Va.,  on  December  I3th,  1862, 
you  ask:  "  How  you  determined  that  fact,  or  in  other  words,  how  you 
recognized  the  dead  nearest  to  our  (your)  works  were  those  of  General 
Humphreys'  Division,"  will  state  that  by  conversing  with  the  wounded 
found  on  the  field  of  battle  in  front  of  Mayre's  Heights  when  I  went  out 
with  the  flag  of  truce,  etc.,  and  was  informed  by  them  that  they  belonged 
to  General  Humphreys'  Division,  and  as  was  quite  natural  we  talked 


3°  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS' 

with  wounded  of  other  commands  in  order  to  find  out  what  troops  made 
the  charges,  etc.  I  notice  one  error  in  my  letter  to  you  of  June  i6th, 
1891,  that  of  the  date  December  isth,  1862,  should  have  been  December 
I3th,  1862.  The  battles  were  fought  December  nth,  i2th  and  i3th,  1862, 
according  to  my  recollection. 

Very  truly  yours, 

(Signed),  ROB'T  I.   FLEMING. 


Some  opinions  well  known  to  General  Walker,  expressed 
by  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  of  the  abilities  pos 
sessed  by  Andrew  Atkinson  Humphreys. 

Campaigns  ot  tbe  GtPil  Mat* 

(SCRII5NER'S.) 

CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG. 

PAGES  174  AND  175 

' '  Humphreys  was  ordered  to  move  his  left  wing  back  to 
form  a  new  oblique  line  to  the  ridge  in  connection  with 
Birney's  Division"  and  again,  "  but  now  he  was  obliged,  while 
executing  this  difficult  manoeuvre  of  a  change  of  front  to  rear, 
to  contend  with  Barksdale's  brigade  of  McL,aws'  Division  on 
his  left  at  the  Peach  Orchard  and  enfilading  batteries  there 
also,  while  his  entire  front  was  called  upon  to  repel  a  most 
determined  assault  from  Anderson's  Division  which  hitherto 
had  not  been  engaged  and  which  now  pressed  with  great  force 
on  his  right  which  still  clung  to  the  road." 

' '  Humphreys  received  orders  to  give  up  his  advanced  posi 
tion  and  fall  back  to  the  ridge  itself.  There  he  turned  at 
bay." 

"  Humphreys'  was  followed  up  by  the  Brigades  of  Wilcox, 
Perry  and  Wright,  about  the  best  fighting  material  in  the 
rebel  army." 

Those  who  have  been  required  to  execute  such  an  evolu 
tion  know  well  what  it  is  and  how  hard  to  perform,  especially 
under  fire.  The  division  were  seasoned  troops  and  worked  it 
out  to  perfection,  loosing  heavily,  some  two  thousand  men. 


CHARGE  AT  MARYE'S  HEIGHTS.  31 

Same  Series. 
ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

PAGE  126 

As  TO  LOVE  OF  FIGHTING. 

"With  officers  and  men  it  was  the  same.  They  did  not 
like  fighting.  Sheridan,  Hancock,  Humphreys,  Kearney, 
Custer,  Barlow,  and  such  as  they  were  exceptions,  but  the  rule 
was  otherwise. " 

PAGE  170 

"Some  of  the  very  best  fighting  that  was  done  at  Fred- 
ericksburg  was  done  by  the  3d  Division  of  the  5th  Corps.  This 
division  was  commanded  by  General  Humphreys,  who  was 
probably  the  best  officer  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  that  day. 
He  was  a  thoroughly  educated  soldier,  possessed  of  a  quick 
eye  and  a  clear  head,  and  a  man  of  fiery  energy.  That  the 
fighting  his  division  did  was  so  good  was  due  to  him." 

' '  As  soon  as  Humphreys  had  ascertained  the  nature  of  the 
enemy's  position,  which  the  urgency  of  the  case  had  put  out 
of  his  power  to  do  before  arriving  with  his  men,  he  became 
satisfied  that  his  fire  could  have  little  effect  upon  them,  and  he 
perceived  that  the  only  mode  of  attacking  him  successfully  was 
with  the  bayonet." 

11  Having  learned  from  experience  (his  first  charge)  what  a 
serious  obstacle  they  would  encounter  from  the  presence  of  the 
mass  of  men  lying  behind  the  natural  embankment  in  front,  he 
directed  them  to  disregard  these  men  entirely  and  pass  over 
them . ' ' 

The  scene  which  followed  was  most  singular,  and  it  is 
well  to  describe  it  in  General  Humphreys'  own  words: 

"As  the  brigades  reached  the  masses  of  men  referred  to 
every  effort  was  made  by  the  latter  to  prevent  our  advance. 
They  called  to  our  men  not  to  go  forward  and  some  attempted 
to  prevent  by  force  their  doing  so.  The  effect  upon  my  com 
mand  was  what  I  apprehended,  the  line  was  somewhat  dis 
ordered,  and  in  part  was  forced  to  form  into  a  column,  but  still 


32  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS' 

advanced  rapidly.  The  fire  of  the  enemy's  musketry  and 
artillery,  furious  as  it  was  before,  now  became  still  hotter. 
The  stone  wall  was  a  sheet  of  flame  that  enveloped  the  head 
and  flanks  of  the  column.  Officers  and  men  were  falling 
rapidly  and  the  head  of  the  column  was  at  length  brought  to  a 
stand  when  close  up  to  the  wall.  Up  to  this  time  not  a  shot 
had  been  fired  by  the  column,  but  now  some  firing  began,  it 
lasted  but  a  minute,  when  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts,  the  column 
turned  and  began  to  retire  slowly." 

The  Confederate  General  Ransom  is  stated  to  have 
reported  as  follows:  "This  last  desperate  and  maddened 
attack  met  the  same  fate  which  had  befallen  those  which  had 
preceded  and  his  troops  were  sent  actually  howling  (singing!) 
back  to  their  beaten  comrades  in  the  town." 

Same  Series. 
PENINSULAR.    PAGE  22. 

"  One  of  the  best  military  authorities  we  have  now  living, 
General  A.  A.  Humphreys,  late  Chief  of  Engineers,  former 
Chief  of  Staff  to  General  Meade,  late  Commander  of  the  2d 
Corps  in  front  of  Richmond,  was  in  favor  of  this  movement." 
"  Urbana  route."  And  again  (page  154):  "General  McClel- 
lan  had  given  orders  for  placing  the  troops  before  they  had 
all  arrived  upon  the  spot,  and  had  assigned  position  to  Porter's 
Corps  and  Couch's  Division  of  Keys,  the  other  corps  as  they 
came  on  the  ground  were  put  in  position  by  General  A.  A. 
Humphreys,  who  had  examined  the  ground  thoroughly  the 
day  before. ' ' 

GRANT  VERSUS  THE  RECORD. 

PAGE  128. 

: '  When  General  Andrew  A.  Humphreys  decided  that  an 
assault  by  the  5th  Army  Corps  could  not  succeed,  few  experi 
enced  military  men  would  wish  to  disregard  his  judgment,  and 
small  reason  was  left  for  criticism  of  defeated  effort. ' ' 


CHARGE  AT  MARYK'S  HEIGHTS.  33 

COMTE  DE  PARIS.    CIVIL  WAR. 
PAGE  595,  VOLUME  ii. 

Writing  of  the  charges  on  Marye's  Hill,  at  Fredericksburg, 
by  the  Divisions  of  French,  Hancock,  Howard,  also  Hum 
phreys,  uses  the  following  language  as  to  the  charges  of  the 
latter' s  Division:  (<  They  rushed  forward  with  such  eagerness 
that  they  nearly  reached  the  foot  of  the  wall  "  (stone).  This 
historian  fails  to  record  such  language  for  the  divisions  of  the 
2d  Corps. 

In  this  particular,  General  Walker's  History  exalting  the 
2d  Corps  above  all  others,  is  another  example  of  the  old  say 
ing:  "The  page  killed  the  boar,  [but  the  king  obtained  the 
glory." — QUINTON  DURWARD. 


{Petersburg,  Di 

APRIL  2D,  1865 


"FIDUS  ET  AUDAX.' 


IT  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  paper  to  detail  at  length  how  the 
Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  James  obtained  and  held  the 
position  from  which  their  final  assault  was  delivered  upon 
the  Confederate  lines  at  Petersburg,  Virginia,  on  the  2d  of 
April,  1865,  and  their  capture.  The  positions  held  by  the 
several  armies  confronting  each  other  will  be  described  in 
general  terms,  for  most,  if  not  all  of  you,  are  acquainted  with 
the  topography  of  that  country,  and  what  was  done  by  both 
sides  to  cover  themselves  by  means  of  earthworks,  and  render 
all  approach,  if  not  impossible  and  impracticable,  at  least 
dangerous  and  difficult,  except  at  a  heavy  expense  of  life  and 
limb.  The  works  erected  for  the  protection  of  the  city 
(Petersburg),  from  the  Appomattox  to  "Battery  No.  10," 
had  been  carried  by  the  Union  troops  on  June  iyth  and  i8th, 
1864,  the  Confederates  retiring  to  the  hills  in  rear,  and  there 
upon  erecting  new  lines  of  defense,  which  are  held,  until 
carried,  and  Petersburg  evacuated  April  2d,  1865.  Their 
lines  of  defense  were  prolonged  to  meet  all  subsequent  exten 
sions  of  ours  to  our  left,  whereby  we  hoped  to  cut  off  from 
them  some  of  their  lines  of  subsistence,  namely,  The  Weldon 
and  South  Side  Railroad,  compel  evacuation  or  surrender. 
Whenever  these  extensions  took  place  both  sides  seized  upon  the 
natural  features  of  the  ground,  converting  them  to  their  benefit, 
first  by  felling  all  trees  in  their  front  for  some  distance  out, 
dropping  the  tops  outward,  thereby  making  it  almost  impossible 
for  any  line  of  troops  to  get  through,  introducing  near  their 

35 


36  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS' 

inner  sides  several  lines  of  wire  which  ran  in  and  out  and 
through  the  branches,  damming  up  Hatcher's  run  in  many 
places,  rendering  it  non-fordable,  placing  in  front  of  their  rifle 
pits  several  lines  of  "Abattis,"  there  again  using  wire;  pro 
tecting  all  natural  crossings  of  the  run  by  dams  and  bridge 
heads,  in  fact  all  measures  used  were  calculated  to  hinder  and 
prolong  the  stay  of  the  attacking  troops  in  their  front,  and 
while  so  exposed  inflicting  upon  them  heavy  losses.  These 
lines  ran  through  woods,  up  and  down  hills,  crossed  open 
places,  small  streams,  with  first,  nothing  but  the  rough  rifle 
pit.  These  in  time  are  improved,  becoming  regular  intrench  - 
ments.  The  ground  held  by  the  Armies  of  the  Potomac  and 
James  began  near  the  Appomattox  river,  and  extending  to  the 
left,  ended  about  one  mile  west  of  Burges'  Mill  (which  was 
upon  Boydtown  plank  road),  a  line,  according  to  recollection, 
something  like  twenty  miles  in  length,  if  not  more.  The  Con 
federate  lines  naturally  followed  this  extension.  These  works 
were,  not  held  by  a  continuous  line  of  troops,  but  in  and  upon 
them  were  constructed  many  enclosed  forts  with  garrisons, 
mutually  supporting  each  other  by  their  fire.  By  these  means 
the  armies  were  enabled  to  cut  loose  from  their  lines  and  meet 
each  other  on  new  fields  but  with  less  numbers. 

On  the  2d  of  April,  1865,  the  positions  of  the  corps  of  the 
Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  James,  were  as  follows:  Com 
mencing  on  right,  first  the  gth  Corps,  then  the  6th,  the  Army 
of  the  James,  then  the  2d  Corps,  which  held  the  extreme  left 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Beyond  this,  with  an  interval 
of  some  four  miles,  more  or  less,  was  Sheridan  at  Five  Forks 
writh  his  Cavalry  and  the  5th  Corps.  Ho\v  the  Confederate 
Corps  were  placed  behind  their  line  is  not  definitely  known 
to  the  writer,  hence  their  positions  are  not  given. 

To  arrive  at  some  idea  of  the  strength  of  the  Armies  of  the 
Potomac  and  James  and  its  opponent  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  research  must  be  had  of  the  most  reliable  data. 
Unfortunately,  the  Rebellion  Records  for  the  year  1865  have 
not  reached  those  for  whom  they  are  intended,  and  the  writer 
has  been  compelled  to  resort  to  such  works  (written  by  the 


AT  PETERSBURG,  VIRGINIA.  37 

principal  actors  in  that  struggle  as  are  now  in  the  hands  of 
almost  everyone,  who  has  taken,  or  still  takes,  interest  in  the 
late  war.  By  reference  to  the  Morning  Reports  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  of  March  3ist,  1865,  we  find  its  strength  to  be: 
Officers  and  enlisted  men  of  all  arms  of  the  service,  74,871 
men,  with  243  guns;  of  the  cavalry  under  Sheridan,  13,820; 
of  the  Army  of  the  James  under  Ord,  22,714  men,  with  56 
guns;  a  total  of  111,405  of  all  arms,  with  299  guns  (field  and 
siege. ) 

Facing  Richmond  and  Bermuda  Hundreds  was  the  25th 
Corps,  with  an  effective  force  of  13,630  men  and  56  guns. 
Of  the  strength  of  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia,  we  find  by 
consulting  their  Morning  Reports  of  February  2oth,  1865  (the 
only  report  so  far  known),  to  be  of  all  arms,  55,500  men.  Lee's 
army  was  divided  into  three  parts;  first,  that  defending  Rich 
mond  and  Bermuda  Hundreds  about  10,000;  that  confronting 
the  Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  the  James,  say  35,000;  lastly, 
those  defeated  by  Sheridan  at  Five  Forks,  about  10,000.  The 
Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  James  naturally  had  assumed  three 
grand  sub-divisions,  that  facing  Richmond,  whose  .strength 
has  been  stated,  while  Sheridan's  Cavalry  had  meanwhile  been 
.strengthened  by  the  addition  of  the  5th  Corps,  bringing  its 
effective  force  to  30,893  men  with  36  guns.  While  the  Army 
of  Potomac  had  lost  by  this  addition  to  Sheridan,  it  gained  that 
of  the  Army  of  the  James,  bringing  its  total  effective  force  to 
80,512  officers  and  men,  facing  Petersburg. 

By  8  A.M.  on  April  2d,  1865,  the  Confederate  outer-lines, 
defending  Petersburg,  had  been  carried  from  one  end  to  the 
other,  and  Lee  is  busily  fighting  with  what  is  left  to  him  of 
his  army  until  nightfall,  when  he  will  evacuate  Petersburg  and 
Richmond,  concentrate  at  the  "Amelia  Court  House,"  march 
from  thence  on  Danville,  N.  C.,  unite  with  Johnson,  beat  back 
Sherman,  who  is  pushing  northward  to  assist  Grant  in  his 
attack  on  Petersburg  and  Richmond.  During  the  day  Lee 
perfected  his  plan  of  retreat,  and  at  nightfall  his  army  crosses 
to  the  left  bank  of  the  Appomattox  river  by  means  of  a 
pontoon  bridge,  the  Pocahontas  and  R.  R.  bridge.  That  part 


38  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS' 

of  his  army  defeated  by  Sheridan  at  Five  Forks  retreats  by  a 
road  called  the  River  road,  up  the  Appomattox  river  on  its 
right  bank.  Of  the  army  which  crossed  by  the  pontoon  bridge 
and  others,  Longstreet  leads  with  Field  Division,  Heth's  and 
Wilcox's  Division  of  Hill's  Corps,  marching  by  the  River  road 
left  bank,  up  the  Appomattox,  intending  to  cross  this  stream 
at  Bevel's  Bridge,  but  finding  it  out  of  order  uses  the  pontoon 
bridge  laid  at  Goodes'  Bridge.  Gordon  follows  the  Hickory 
road,  crossing  the  river  at  Goodes'  Bridge,  follows  Long- 
street.  Mahones'  Division  passing  through  Chesterfield  Court 
House,  used  the  bridge  at  Goodes',  follows  Gordon.  Ewell's 
command  composed  of  Kershaw's  and  Custis  Lee's  Divisions, 
crosses  the  James  river  at  and  below  Richmond;  takes  the 
Genito  road,  followed  by  Geary's  Cavalry  as  rear  guard,  and 
crosses  the  Appomattox  by  the  Danville  R.  R.  bridge.  The 
Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  James  slept  quietly  the  night  of 
April  2d,  1865,  inside  of  the  lines  captured  by  them  that  day, 
intending  on  the  next  morning,  April  3d,  1865,  to  assault  the 
inner  works,  which  at  nightfall  of  that  day  still  defended 
Petersburg,  but  on  awakening  find  their  prey  had  escaped. 
Pursuit  is  immediately  given,  our  cavaly  overtaking  the  Con 
federate  rear  guard,  near  Namozine  Church,  which  was 
defeated.  At  Deep  Creek  another  engagement  near  dark  took 
place.  Here  our  cavalry  halted  with  the  2d,  5th  and  6th 
Corps  well  closed  up.  Let  us  turn  back  to  the  force  defeated 
at  Five  Forks  by  Sheridan,  and  those  by  the  2d  Corps,  \vhich 
I  have  stated  retreated  by  the  River  road,  south  bank  of  the 
Appomattox  river,  on  April  2d,  1865.  This  force  fell  back 
from  Sheridan  and  the  2d  Corps,  by  way  of  the  Ford  and 
Clayborne  roads,  to  Sutherland  Station,  on  the  South  Side  Rail 
road,  where  it  made  a  stand  for  some  time,  until  driven  from 
the  field  by  General  Miles,  commanding  the  ist  Division  2d 
Corps.  This  division  (Miles)  returned  by  Sheridan  on  the 
morning  of  April  2d,  1865,  was  on  its  way  back  to  the  2d 
Corps,  but  turned  down  the  Clayborne  road  (under  orders  of 
the  commander  of  the  2d  Corps)  and  struck  the  enemy  at  the 
beforementioned  station.  This  division  was  followed  by  the 


AT  PETERSBURG,  VIRGINIA.  39 

other  two  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps  on  the  same  road,  but 
before  Miles'  first  engagement  were  deflected  towards  Peters 
burg,  the  Lieutenant-General  intending  this  part  of  the  field 
for  Sheridan's  exclusive  use  (see  "Personal  Memoirs  of 
Lieut. -General  P.  H.  Sheridan,"  page  173,  Vol.  2).  During 
April  3d,  nothing  was  accomplished  by  the  Cavalry  and  the  5th 
Corps,  except  the  rear  guard  fights  at  Namozine  Church  and 
Deep  Creek,  Virginia.  Precept  No.  i,  with  two  others,  which 
follow  naturally  on  the  application  of  the  first,  governed 
Napoleon  in  all  his  campaigns,  is  here  lost  sight  of.  Sheridan's 
Cavalry  with  the  5th  Corps,  together  with  the  2d  Corps,  in 
all  52,060  men  and  many  guns,  are  more  than  a.  match  for  the 
enemy  probably  not  over  10,000  strong?  Had  General  Grant 
permitted  the  2d  Corps  to  follow  and  engage  the  enemy  at 
Sutherland  Station  Sheridan  would  probably  have  closed  in  on 
their  right  flank  and  rear.  Not  one  would  have  been  left  to 
retreat  up  the  River  road  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Appo- 
mattox.  Precept  No.  i  reads:  "Engage  your  masses  with 
the  fractions  of  the  enemy's  forces,  or  your  large  fractions 
with  his  small  ones."  We  have  now  reached  a  point  where, 
had  "  the  three  precepts  "  been  applied,  there  would  have  been 
no  Appomattox,  and  the  surrender  of  Lee  would  have  taken 
place  sooner.  A  glance  at  the  map  reveals  two  rivers,  the 
James  and  the  Appomattox,  which  unite  but  a  few  miles  below 
Petersburg,  Va.  It  was  well  known  to  Grant  Lee,  would  push 
south  as  fast  as  possible.  To  prevent  this  a  strong  column  of 
troops,  say  those  under  Sheridan,  to  which  could  have  been 
added  the  2d  Corps,  in  all  52,060  men  (leaving  with  Grant  at 
Petersburg,  57,200  men  to  carry  on  the  siege),  should  have  been 
organized,  with  orders  to  push  up  the  Appomattox  on  the  2d 
of  April,  1865,  as  fast  as  possible,  and  hold  all  probable  and 
possible  crossings  of  the  river.  The  points  which  would  have 
been  held,  in  all  probability,  had  this  column  been  formed, 
would  undoubtedly  have  been  those  used  by  the  Confederate 
troops  in  their  retreat,  besides,  this  column  would  have  cut  off 
from  Lee  his  only  road  by  which  supplies  could  reach  him, 
namely,  the  Richmond  and  Danville  R.  R.  This  operation 


4Q  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS. 

would  have  cooped  L,ee  between  two  rivers  with  no  means  of 
living,  except  upon  the  county  and  that  almost  exhausted,  and 
forced  him  to  fight  a  battle  under  disadvantageous  circum 
stances,  forming  front  to  a  flank.  This  manoeuvre  is  in  accord 
ance  with  Precept  No  2,  (<  Always  operate  upon  interior  lines"; 
and  with  Precept  No.  3,  "  Operate  as  far  as  possible  upon  the 
communications  of  the  enemy  without  exposing  your  own." 


•{Reflections. 

Have  the  heavy  blows,  administered  by  I^ee,  on  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  from  the  Wilderness,  1864,  and  including  Din- 
widdie  Court  House,  1865,  made  some  impression  on  General 
Grant.  Our  forces,  collectively  speaking,  Cavalry,  5th  and 
2d  Corps,  had  the  preponderance  of  numbers  and  held  the 
shortest  line  to  the  various  crossings  of  the  Appomattox  above 
Petersburg.  From  Petersburg  by  the  North  River  road  to 
Goodes'  Bridge,  it  is  about  35  miles,  by  the  South  River 
road,  from  Sutherland  Station  to  the  same  point,  it  is  about 
25  miles.  Grant  must  have  been  aware  of  the  topography  of 
the  country,  by  means  of  his  spies,  and  his  stay  at  City  Point, 
Va.,  from  June  iQth,  1864,  up  to  and  including  April  2d,  1865. 
Much  information  must  have  been  gathered  of  the  topography 
of  the  country,  fording  of  streams,  the  means  of  crossing  the 
Appomattox  river,  their  distance  each  from  the  other  and  from 
Petersburg,  Virginia. 


farmville, 

APRIL  7TH,  1865 


AMICUS     PLATO,    AMICUS    SOCRATES,    SED    MAGIS 
AMICUS  VERLTAS." 


WE  resume  our  narrative  of  last  year,  having  on  April  3d, 
1865,  left  the  opposing  forces  (Union  and  Confederate) 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Appomattox  river,  at  Deep 
Creek,  whilst  the  balance  of  Lee's  Army  is  marching  forward 
to  Amelia  Court  House,  concentrating  there.  General  Grant 
in  his  memoirs,  volume  2,  page  466,  states,  "we  had  now  no 
other  objective  than  the  Confederate  Armies  and  I  was  anxious 
to  close  the  thing  up  at  once." 

This  language  of  the  Lieutenant  General  carries  great 
weight  and  will  be  referred  to  later  on.  It  is  now  advanced, 
and  attention  called  to  its  purport  and  it  should  not  be  for 
gotten.  It  will  be  brought  to  your  attention,  when  a  part  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  and  that  of  Northern  Virginia,  Com 
manded  by  General  Lee,  face  each  other  at  Farmville  as  we 
style  that  fight,  or  the  so-called  encounter  at  Cumberland 
Church  of  the  Confederates. 

Sheridan  pushes  forward  on  the  4th  of  April  1865,  arriving 
at  Jetersville,  Va.,  late  that  afternoon,  with  the  Cavalry  of 
Crook's  and  most  of  his  own  mounted  troops.  He  intrenches 
at  once,  but  sends  out  to  his  left  and  front,  some  cavalry,  with 
directions  to  ascertain,  if  possible,  the  disposition  of  Lee's 
forces,  what  points  are  held  and  what  roads  are  occupied,  what 
are  or  will  be  his  intentions;  presuming  he  (Lee)  still  holds  to 
his  original  plan  of  uniting  with  Johnston  in  North  Carolina. 

41 


42  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

The  2d  and  6th  Corps  follow  upon  the  same  route  as  that 
used  by  the  Cavalry  and  5th  Corps,  but  were  impeded  by  our 
Cavalry  coming  from  our  right  flank. 

This  arm  having  precedence,  the  two  Corps  give  way  to 
them.  The  Corps  also  are  required  to  furnish  large  working 
parties  to  repair  the  roads,  as  they  were  nearly  impassable  for 
wagons.  At  one  o'clock  A.  M.  of  the  5th  of  April,  1865,  the 
march  was  resumed  by  the  2d  and  6th  Corps,  but  proceeding  only 
a  short  distance  forward,  were  again  delayed  by  the  Cavalry, 
coming  in  from  our  right,  on  their  way  to  Jetersville,  and  it 
was  not  till  near  3  p.  M.  of  that  day  that  the  2d  Corps  began 
to  arrive  at  Jetersville,  followed  by  the  6th  Corps.  Our  In 
fantry  are  placed  in  the  following  positions,  the  6th  Corps  on 
the  right  of  the  5th  Corps,  the  2d  on  the  left  of  the  5th  Corps, 
which  latter  Corps  held  the  centre.  All  faced  north,  or  in 
the  direction  of  Amelia  Court  House,  \vhere  was  then  Lee's 
Army. 

Here  Lee  was  concentrating,  but  this  concentration  was  not 
effected  until  some  time  in  the  afternoon  of  April  5th,  1865. 
Lee  expected  by  a  well  conducted  night  march  westward,  to 
get  so  far  in  advance,  that  he  might  reach  Lyncburgh  by  pass 
ing  through  Deatonsville,  Rice's  Station  and  Farmville,  and 
possibly  might  reach  Danville  (see  page  376,  "Virginia  Cam 
paigns,  1864-65").  His  Army  at  nightfall  began  its  retreat, 
by  roads  passing  to  our  left  flank  and  rear — Longstreet  reach 
ing  Rice's  Station  at  sunrise  April  6th,  1865,  where  he  waited 
for  the  coming  up  of  the  rest  of  the /onfederate  forces — Ewell 
was  at  Amelia  Springs  about  8  A.  M.  of  April  6th,  1865 — 
Gordon's  Corps  was  the  rear  guard. 

The  Confederate  wagon  trains  pushed  fonvard  on  their  right 
flank  on  roads  which  were  covered  by  their  forces.  All  were 
to  cross  Sailor's  creek,  at  or  near  Perkinson  Mills,  near  its 
mouth  in  the  Appomattox  River.  The  Confederate  troops 
were  to  cross  this  stream  (Sailor's  creek)  two  or  three  miles 
further  up  and  on  the  road  to  Rice's  Station,  and  all  bridges 
which  had  been  used  by  them  were  then  to  be  destroyed,  as 
well  as  the  one  at  Amelia  Springs.  A  part  of  Sheridan's 


AT  FARMVILLE,  VIRGINIA.  43 

mounted  force,  during  the  4th  and  5th  of  April,  1865,  struck 
the  Danville  railroad  between  Burkes  Station  and  Jetersville, 
and  then  moved  upon  the  latter  place,  arriving  there  April  5th, 
1865.  The  5th  Corps  marched  direct  on  Jetersville.  Davies' 
Brigade  of  Crook's  Division  of  Cavalry  made  a  reconnaissance 
to  Paines  Cross  Roads,  about  five  miles  north  of  Amelia 
Springs,  to  ascertain  if  Lee  was  making  any  attempt  to  escape 
by  that  flank. 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  April,  1865,  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  with  deploying  intervals,  moved  towards  Amelia 
Court  House  for  the  purpose  of  engaging  Lee's  force  if  still 
there.  At  8:30  A.M.  of  this  day,  when  about  four  miles  out,  a 
strong  column  of  the  Confederates  wras  discovered  by  the  2d 
Corps  moving  westward  on  the  north  bank  of  Flat  creek. 
The  Corps  was  halted,  dispositions  were  made  for  attack,  and 
this  information  (discovery  of  the  enemy)  immediately  com 
municated  to  General  Meade.  A  short  time  before  this  dis 
covery  of  the  2d  Corps,  General  Meade' s  signal  officers 
discovered  the  enemy's  trains  several  miles  distant  moving 
westward  and  escorted  by  cavalry.  General  Griffin,  at  Hill's 
Shop,  received  undoubted  information  Lee  had  left  Amelia 
Court  House,  moving  wrest.  At  9:30  A.M.,  same  day,  General 
Meade' s  signal  officers  reported  an  infantry  column,  some  three 
or  four  miles  distant,  moving  in  a  north-westerly  direction,  and 
again  another  column,  some  six  or  seven  miles  distant,  both 
moving  quickly.  All  this  information  left  no  doubt  General 
Lee  had  during  the  night  been  passing  to  our  left  and  rear. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  this  information  General  Meade  at  once 
faced  his  army  to  the  rear  (ours)  and  directed  the  2d  Corps  to 
move  on  Deatonville,  the  5th  Corps  to  move  to  the  right  of  the 
2d  and  through  Painsville,  the  6th  Corps  through  Jetersville 
and  take  position  on  the  left  of  the  2d  Corps.  A  brigade  of 
the  2d  Corps  at  once  forded  Flat  creek,  the  water  reaching 
nearly  to  their  armpits.  This  stream  is  not  less  than  100  feet 
wide.  Bridges  were  built  in  short  time  (material  being  handy) 
for  the  passage  of  the  Corps  with  its  artillery  and  ambulances. 

"A  sharp  running  fight  commenced  at  once  with  Gordon's 


44  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

Corps,  which  was  continued  over  a  distance  of  fourteen  (14) 
miles,  during  which  several  partially-intrenched  positions  were 
carried.  The  country  was  broken,  consisting  of  woods  with 
dense  undergrowth  and  swamps,  alternating  with  open  fields, 
through  and  over  which  the  line  of  battle  followed  closely  on 
the  skirmish  line  with  a  rapidity  and  good  order  that  is 
believed  to  be  unexampled.  Artillery  moved  with  the  skirmish 
line.  (See  page  379,  "  Virginia  Campaigns,  1864-65.") 

Histories  have  been  searched  to  discover  if  a  corps  of  20,000 
men  or  less  have  ever  before  executed  such  a  manoeuvre,  but  I 
have  failed  to  find  anything  which  approaches  it.  All  text 
books  instruct  in  the  pursuit  of  a  rear  guard,  the  pursuer  loses 
time  in  changing  from  the  order  of  march  to  the  order  of 
battle.  The  pursued  then  draws  off  and  resumes  the  march. 
The  pursuer  must  then  change  from  the  order  of  battle  to  that 
of  march.  This  is  obligatory.  Here  is  an  advance  on  what  is 
taught.  No  soldier  will  be  guided  by  these  rules,  unless  he  be 
pedantic.  The  true  commander  will  change  his  formation  for 
pursuit  to  suit  himself,  adapting  himself  to  the  topography  of 
the  country. 

The  result  of  this  relentless  chase  gave  the  Confederates  no 
rest  and  jammed  their  rear  guard  (and  a  good  one  too)  up,  and 
into  the  forces  which  they  were  endeavoring  to  protect;  and 
the  result  of  this  energetic  action  on  the  part  of  this  soldier  was 
to  assist  materially  in  the  subsequent  capture  of  a  large  Con 
federate  force  at  Sailor's  Creek  that  afternoon. 

Has  any  one  ever  heard  of  artillery  being  on  the  skirmish 
line  before  this?  The  Germans  advocate  the  use  of  artillery 
well  advanced.  They  are  students  in  all  things  and  lead  the 
world.  But  who  before  ever  heard  of  artillery  on  the  skirmish 
line  until  this  example  is  brought  to  your  notice  ? 

Anderson  halted  some  time  in  the  morning  at  the  forks  of 
the  road  near  J.  Hott's  house.  The  right-hand  road  leads  to 
Perkinsen  Mills,  some  three  or  four  miles  down  Sailor's  Creek, 
the  left-hand  road  leads  direct  to  Rice's  Station. 

General  Sheridan,  early  on  the  6th  of  April,  directed  Crook 
to  move  to  Deatonsville;  Merritt  to  follow.  About  midday 


AT  FARMVIU,E,  VIRGINIA.  45 

Crook  made  a  dash  at  the  trains  Anderson  was  guarding  but 
was  repulsed.  Merritt  joining  Crook  soon  after  this  repulse, 
a  second  attempt  was  made  upon  them,  but  Anderson  being 
reinforced  by  Hwell,  whose  troops  were  then  arriving,  this 
second  attempt  was  defeated.  When  the  head  of  Gordon's 
Corps  reached  Hotts,  Anderson  crossed  Sailor's  Creek,  followed 
by  Ewell,  and  line  of  battle  was  formed  across  the  Rice  Station 
road.  The  command  partially  intrenched.  Gordon  after  the 
passage  of  the  main  trains  of  Lee's  army,  which  moved  on  and 
down  the  right-hand  fork,  followed  after  them  to  Perkinsen's 
mills,  the  2d  Corps  close  upon  him.  When  General  Hum 
phreys  arrived  at  the  aforementioned  forks  of  the  road  he  per 
ceived  Ewell 's  troops,  or  part  of  them,  forming  line  of  battle 
along  the  north  side  of  Sailor's  Creek.  He  was* aware  Sheridan 
was  close  upon  Ewell,  but  "not  aware  Anderson's  command 
was  across  that  road  on  the  crest  beyond  Ewell,"  and  seeing 
the  whole  of  the  6th  Corps  near  at  hand  he  continued  his  pur 
suit  of  Gordon's  Corps  on  the  right  hand  forks  down  Sailor's 
Creek.  "This  running  fight  with  Gordon's  Corps  continued 
for  three  miles  further,  the  road  Tor  many  miles  being  strewn 
with  tents,  camp  equipage,  baggage,  battery  forges,  limbers 
and  wagons.  The  last  attempted  stand  was  near  Perkinsen's 
Mills  (Sailor's  Creek)  when  just  before  dark  a  short,  sharp 
conflict  gave  us  many  flags,  three  guns,  several  hundred 
prisoners,  and  a  large  part  of  the  main  trains  of  Lee's  Army, 
which  were  huddled  together  in  a  confused  mass  at  the  cross 
ing  of  the  creek.  Gordon  attempted  to  form  on  the  high 
ground  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  creek,  but  fell  back  quickly 
from  it  as  our  troops  crossed.  Darkness  put,  a  stop  to  the 
pursuit  until  next  morning,  for  the  country  and  roads  were 
unknown  to  us.  Gordon  reached  High  Bridge  that  night. 
(See  page  381,  "  Virginia  Campaigns,  1864-65.")  "The  5th 
Corps,  right  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  moved  on  the  Paine- 
ville  road  to  Ligonton  Ferry,  a  distance  of  thirty-two  (32) 
miles,  but  encountered  none  of  the  Confederate  forces."  (See 
page  382,  "  Virginia  Campaigns,  1864-1865.") 

' '  General  Ord  being  notified  on  the  6th  of  April  that  Lee 


46  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

was  apparently  moving  towards  Burke 's  Junction  at  first  pre 
pared  to  meet  him  there,  but  subsequently,  with  a  view  of 
intercepting  him,  moved  along  the  Lynchburg  R.  R.,  and 
after  marching  some  eight  (8)  or  ten  (10)  miles  came  upon 
Longstreet  intrenched  at  Rice's  Station.  It  was  night  before 
his  troops  were  in  position."  (See  page  381,  "  Virginia  Cam 
paigns,  1864-65.")  lyongstreet  remained  all  day  at  this  place 
waiting  for  Anderson,  Ewell  and  Gordon  to  unite  with  him. 
The  troops  of  these  gentlemen  were  covering  their  trains,  but 
notwithstanding  their  united  efforts  the  greater  part  of  them 
(the  trains)  were  destroyed  or  captured.  Had  Lee  cut  down 
his  transportation,  reserving  only  a  sufficient  number  to  carry 
ammunition,  very  little  baggage  and  hospital  stores,  and  his 
ambulances,  and  abandoning  the  rest  he  undoubtedly  would 
have  succeeded  in  his  undertaking,  eluded  the  pursuing  army 
and  joined  Johnston,  but  by  his  holding  on  to  them  he  clogged 
his  marches.  All  his  movements  were  subservient  to  their 
protection,  and  they  eventually  compelled  the  surrender  of  his 
army. 

The  captures  of  the  2d  Cdrps  this  day  amounted  to  thirteen 
(13)  flags,  four  (4)  guns,  and  seventeen  hundred  (1700) 
prisoners,  without  counting  the  killed  and  wounded,  which 
must  have  been  considerable.  On  the  night  of  the  6th  of 
April,  General  L,ongstreet  moved  to  Farmville,  crossed  the 
Appomattox  early  on  the  morning  of  April  yth,  and  moved  out 
on  the  road  to  Lynchburg.  Rations  for  the  army  of  Northern 
Virginia  were  here  distributed.  General  Gordon  crossed  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  Appomattox  river  at  High  Bridge.  He  used 
also,  near  the  former,  a  wagon  road  bridge.  General  Ord 
finding  the  enemy  had  left  their  position  in  his  front  followed 
on  to  Farmville.  General  Sheridan  sent  General  Merritt's 
cavalry  towards  Prince  Edward  Court  House  to  intercept  any 
movement  of  the  enemy  towards  Danville,  and  Crook  was 
ordered  to  Farmville.  The  5th  Corps  moved  to  Prince  Edward 
Court  House,  the  2d  and  6th  Corps  took  up  the  direct  pursuit 
of  the  enemy,  the  latter  Corps  moving  to  Farmville  following 
General  Ord.  The  2d  Corps  resumed  the  pursuit  at  5:30  A.  M., 


AT  FARMVH.I.E,  VIRGINIA.  47 

April  yth,  1865,  by  roads  nearest  the  river,  following  those 
which  appeared  to  have  been  in  use  by  the  Confederates,  and 
came  upon  them  at  High  Bridge  just  as  they  blew  up  a  bridge 
head  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river.  The  enemy  had  set 
fire  to  the  railroad  bridge  on  the  North  side  and  attempted  to 
burn  the  wagon  bridge,  but  General  Barlow's  Division,  leading 
that  day,  were  too  quick  for  them  and  this  bridge  was  saved  to 
us.  Had  it  been  burnt,  we  should  have  been  unable  to  cross, 
the  river  being  non-fordable.  Four  spans  of  the  railroad 
bridge  were  burnt,  the  rest  saved  by  the  exertion  of  some  men 
of  the  2d  Corps,  the  pioneers  of  the  corps.  Whilst  this  body 
of  men  were  engaged  in  saving  the  bridge  a  lively  fight  was  in 
progress  beneath  them,  the  Confederates  endeavoring  to  drive 
off  our  men  and  burn  the  wagon  bridge,  and  we  to  drive  them 
away  and  prevent  the  accomplishment  of  their  object.  Our 
efforts  to  this  end  were  successful  and  the  2d  Corps  crossed. 
The  brick  piers  of  the  railroad  bridge,  some  twenty  in  number, 
are  sixty  feet  high. 

Mahone's  Division,  Confederate,  moved  off  in  a  north 
westerly  direction,  and  Gordon  moved  up  the  river  along  the 
railroad  bed  in  the  direction  of  Farmville.  The  2d  Corps 
(two  divisions)  marched  on  the  road  mentioned  as  running  in  a 
northwesterly  direction,  which  road  intersects  the  stage  road, 
four  miles  north  of  Farmville — Mahone  used  this  road.  The 
division  sent  up  the  railroad  bed,  on  nearing  Farmville,  finds 
this  town  still  held  by  the  enemy  in  strong  force.  They  had 
set  fire  to  the  bridges  and  were  covering  a  wagon  train  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  river  running  to  Lynchburg.  Here  Barlow's 
Division  (26.  Corps)  caused  the  Confederates  by  his  disposi 
tions  to  burn  150  wagons  to  prevent  them  from  falling  into  his 
hands,  which  they  otherwise  would.  Our  troops  concentrated 
about  Farmville  that  day  but  were  prevented  from  crossing  the 
river  as  it  was  not  fordable  there  for  infantry,  besides  no 
pontoon  train  was  then  available.  The  two  divisions  of  the 
2d  Corps  arrived  near  the  stage  road  about  i  P.  M.  and  came  in 
contact  with  the  enemy,  who  opened  with  artillery.  Disposi 
tion  was  at  once  made  for  an  attack.  A  heavy  skirmish  line 


48  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

was  pressed  forward  at  once  for  the  purpose  of  developing  his 
position. 

"  From  prisoners  taken  it  was  found  Lee's  whole  army  was 
present  in  a  strong  position,  covering  the  Stage  and  Plank 
roads,  which  position  was  sufficiently  intrenched  for  cover — 
artillery  was  in  place."  (See  page  388,  "  Virginia  Campaigns, 
1864-65.")  The  heavy  skirmish  line  was  pressed  against 
General  Lee  and  an  attack  threatened  by  the  two  divisions, 
and  an  unsuccessful  attack  was  made  to  take  General  Lee  in 
flank.  The  division  which  had  marched  against  Farmville  by 
the  railroad  bed  was  sent  for,  and  General  Meade  informed; 
Lee  with  what  was  left  of  his  army,  probably  18,000  strong, 
had  been  come  up  with.  General  Meade  on  the  receipt  of  this 
information  directed  General  Gibbon  with  the  24th  Corps,  and 
General  Wright  with  the  6th  Corps,  both  of  which  were  at  or 
near  Farmville,  to  cross  the  river  and  attack  Lee  in  rear,  whilst 
the  2d  Corps  attacked  in  front. 

The  position  occupied  by  General  Lee,  at  Farmville,  re 
sembles  that  held  by  us  at  Gettysburg,  "in  petto."  All  that 
was  required  to  carry  it  was  that  it  should  be  punched.  But 
this  punching  does  not  take  place,  for  the  reason  neither 
General  Meade  nor  the  Commander  of  the  2d  Corps  were 
aware  that  there  was  no  available  pontoon  bridge.  Here  was 
the  "  objective  "  so  ardently  desired  by  General  Grant,  and  the 
opportunity  offered  to  his  anxiety,  "to  close  the  thing  up  at 
once."  Lee's  army  had  been  brought  to  bay  and  by  a  so- 
called  "laggard."  The  troops,  excepting  one  corps  (that 
engaged)  are  too  widely  scattered  to  permit  of  rapid  concentra 
tion  at  the  one  point,  and  are  principally  engaged  in  marching 
on  parallel  roads  south  of  those  in  use  by  the  enemy,  to  prevent 
his  moving  down  into  North  Carolina,  besides,  I  venture  to 
say  the  coming  up  with  the  enemy  that  day  at  Farmville  was 
not  on  the  calendar,  and  in  consequence  our  combinations  were 
upset.  The  tactics  used  by  us  in  the  pursuit  of  Lee  resemble 
those  of  the  summer  of  1864.  No  provision  is  made  whereby 
rivers  can  be  crossed.  What  if  the  pontoon  bridge  train  had 
been  at  Farmville  when  troops  arrived  there,  a  bridge  con- 


AT  FARMVILLE,  VIRGINIA.  49 

structed  and  troops  crossed?  Farmville  would  have  been 
written  and  Appomattox  unknown. 

Some  firing  being  heard  in  the  direction  of  Farmville, 
which  was  thought  to  be  the  6th  Corps  advancing,  the  left 
flank  of  the  2d  Corps  was  shortened  and  the  right  flank 
extended,  with  a  view  of  enveloping  Lee's  left  flank.  An 
attack  was  delivered  on  our  part  but  repulsed  with  heavy  loss. 
The  firing  heard  proceeded  from  a  part  of  General  Crook's 
cavalry,  which  had  forded  the  river.  This  force  was  defeated 
with  the  loss  of  many  killed  and  wounded  and  prisoners. 
General  Crook  was  recalled  and  directed  to  move  to  Prospect 
Station  on  the  Lynchburg  Railroad,  ten  or  twelve  miles  from 
Farmville.  This  was  reached  about  midnight. 

Pardon  me  if  I,  like  Badeau,  who,  when  some  orders  were 
given  for  the  execution  of  a  movement  by  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  remarks  ' '  after  percolating  through  the  brains  of 
the  several  commanders  one  would  fail  to  recognize  them,  as 
all  strength  and  decision  had  vanished,  died  of  inanition. ' '  Yet 
it  is  strange  the  news  of  Lee's  army  held  fast  at  Farmville, 
Va.,  during  the  day  of  April  yth,  1865,  if  peradventure  the 
news  suffered  the  same  attenuation  going  up  which  he  (Badeau) 
claims  had  befallen  these  mentioned  beforehand  going  down, 
this,  if  true,  yet  retained  sufficient  vitality,  when  reaching 
Sheridan  at  Prince  Edward  Court  House,  for  him  to  see  what 
\vas  to  be  gained  by  such  an  unfortunate  mishap  as  befell  Lee's 
army  on  that  day.*  General  Griffin  reported  at  7:30  p.  M.,  of 
April  yth,  1865,  when  he  arrived  at  Prince  Edward  Court 
House  the  rear  of  the  cavalry  was  then  leaving  the  town. 
This  place  by  map  is  distant  from  Farmville  some  six  miles, 
and  from  Appomattox  Station  about  24  miles.  (See  R.  R., 
page  628,  Vol.  46.) 

As  to  the  kind  of  fighting  by  the  2d  Corps  that  day  the 
following  is  quoted  from  McGowen,  South  Carolina  Brigade. 
(See  foot  note  page  390,  "  Virginia  Campaigns,  1864-65.") 

' '  The  enemy  seems  to  be  ubiquitous.     We  were  instructed 

*But  see  pages  188  and  189,  Vol.  II.,  of  "Gen.  P.  H.  Sheridan  Memoirs,"  and 
pages  396  and  397  "  Virginia  Campaign,  1864-65." 


50  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

to  be  prepared  to  fight  on  either  flank;  on  our  right  flank 
firing  was  pretty  steadily  kept  up,  in  our  front  a  regular  battle 
was  going  on.  Mahone's  Division  was  engaged  and  a  portion 
of  Field's.  The  firing  increased  in  rapidity  and  extent  until 
three  sides  were  at  once  set  upon  by  the  enemy.  I  never  was 
so  bewildered  as  on  this  occasion." 

In  Volume  II.,  "Memoirs  of  General  Grant,"  page  476, 
speaking  of  the  enemy  who  burnt  the  railroad  bridge  at  High 
Bridge,  April  yth,  1865,  we  find  him  saying,  "Humphreys  forced 
his  way  across  with  some  loss,  and  followed  Lee  to  the  inter 
section  of  the  road,  crossing  at  Farmville  with  the  one  from 
Petersburg.  Here  Lee  held  a  position,  which  was  very  strong 
naturally,  besides  being  intrenched.  Humphreys  was  alone 
confronting  him  all  through  the  day,  and  in  a  very  hazardous 
position.  He  put  on  a  bold  face  however,  and  assaulted  with 
some  loss,  but  was  not  assaulted  in  return." 

And  again  on  page  478,  same  volume,  speaking  of  April 
7th,  1865:  "Sheridan  and  Ord  were  pushing  through  away 
to  the  south  (and  Humphreys  confronting  Lee  as  before 
stated).  After  having  gone  into  bivouack  at  Prince  Edward 
Court  House,  Sheridan  learning  that  seven  (7)  trains  of  pro 
visions  and  forage  were  at  Appomattox  determined  to  start  at 
once  and  capture  them,  and  a  forced  march  was  necessary  to 
get  there  before  Lee's  army  could  secure  them." 

From  the  "Virginia  Campaign,  1864-65,"  page  391,  I 
quote:  "By  the  detention  until  night  at  this  place  (Farm 
ville)  General  Lee  lost  invaluable  time,  which  he  could  not 
regain  by  night  marching;  lost  the  supplies  awaiting  him  at 
Appomattox  Station,  and  gave  time  to  Sheridan  with  his 
cavalry,  and  Ord  with  the  5th  and  24th  Corps,  to  put  them 
selves  across  his  path  at  Appomattox  Court  House. 

' '  If  no  infantry  had  crossed  the  Appomattox  on  the  7th  of 
April  he  could  have  reached  New  Store  that  night,  Appomat 
tox  Station  on  the  afternoon  of  the  8th  of  April,  1865,  obtained 
rations  there  and  moved  that  evening  towards  Lynchburg.  A 
march  the  next  day,  the  gth  of  April,  would  have  brought  him 
to  Lynchburg.  Ord's  two  (2)  infantry  corps  did  not  reach 


AT  FARMVIU.E,  VIRGINIA.  51 

Appomattox  Court  House  until  10  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  9th  April,  1865." 

Let  us  turn  to  the  other  side  (Confederate)  and  see  what 
their  views  are  regarding  the  events  of  this  day,  April  yth, 
1865.  On  pages  386  and  387,  "Great  Commander  Series," 
General  Lee  by  his  nephew,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  says: 

"  The  once  great  army  of  Northern  Virginia,  was  now  com 
posed  of  two  (2)  small  corps  of  infantry,  and  the  cavalry 
corps,  resumed  the  march  towards  Lynchburg  on  the  Stage 
road,  but  after  going  four  miles  stopped  and  was  formed  into 
line  of  battle  in  a  well  chosen  position,  to  give  the  trains  time 
to  get  through.  It  was  attacked  by  two  divisions  of  Hum 
phreys'  2d  Corps,  which  had  been  long  hanging  on  its  rear, 
but  repulsed  them.  Mahone  handled  Miles  roughly.  Had 
Lee  not  stopped  to  fight  he  could  have  reached  Appomattox 
Station  the  afternoon  of  the  8th  April,  obtained  rations,  and 
moved  that  evening  to  Lynchburg.  The  delay  allowed 
Sheridan,  with  two  divisions  of  Cavalry,  followed  by  Ord's 
Infantry  and  5th  Corps,  marching  by  Prince  Edward  Court 
House  to  reach  Appomattox  Station  on  the  evening  of  the  8th 
of  April,  where  he  captured  trains  with  Lee's  supplies  and 
obstructed  his  march.  Ord's  Infantry  did  not  arrive  in  front 
of  Appomattox  Court  House  until  10  A.  M.  of  the  Qth  of  Ar^ril, 
1865." 

The  2d  and  6th  Corps  resumed  the  direct  pursuit  at  5:30 
A.  M.  on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  and  that  night  went  into 
camp  three  (3)  miles  in  rear  of  Longstreet — a  march  of  twenty- 
six  miles  for  that  day. 

As  to  the  operations  performed  by  the  2d' Corps,  on  April 
6th,  1865,  we  find  on  page  600,  Vol.  46,  R.  R.,  the  following 
despatch  from  the  Commander  of  the  2d  Corps,  which  reads: 

7-30  P.  M.  HEADQUARTERS  2D  CORPS,  April  6th,  1865. 

To  BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  S.  WEBB, 
CHIEF  OF  STAFF. 

Our  last  fight  just  before  dark,  at  Sailor's  Creek,  gave  us  two  (2) 
guns,  three  (3)  flags  and  considerable  number  of  prisoners,  two  hundred 
(200)  wagons,  seventy  ambulances,  with  mules  and  horses  to  about  one 


52  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

half  of  the  wagons  and  ambulances.  There  are  between  thirty  (30)  and 
fifty  (50)  wagons,  in  addition,  abandoned  and  destroyed  along  the  road, 
some  battery  wagons,  forges  and  limbers.  I  have  already  reported  to 
you  the  capture  of  one  (i)  gun,  two  (2)  flags  and  some  prisoners,  and  the 
fact  that  the  road,  for  over  two  (2)  miles,  is  strewn  with  baggage,  cooking 
utensils,  some  ammunition,  and  materials  of  all  kinds. 

The  wragons  are  in  a  great  mass  across  the  approach  to  the  bridge, 
and  will  take  some  time  to  clear  it. 

(Signed),     A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

Major-General,  Commanding. 

And  on  page  596,  same  Vol.  of  R.  R.,  is  found  the  follow 
ing  despatch  from  Major- General  Meade,  Commanding  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac: 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

April  6th,  1865,  10  p.  m. 
Received  3:20  A.  M.,  April  yth,  1865. 
To  LIEUTENANT-GENERAI,  GRANT. 

#-fc#-x-##### 
The  6th  Corps  came  up  with  the  enemy  about  4  P.M.,  in  conjunction 
with  the  2d  Corps  on  the  right,  and  the  Cavalry  on  the  left.  Attacked 
and  routed  the  enemy,  captured  many  prisoners;  among  them  Lieut. 
General  Ewell,  General  Custis  Lee.  I  transmit  despatches  both  from 
General  Humphreys  and  General  Wright,  which  in  justice  to  these  dis 
tinguished  officers  and  the  gallant  corps  they  commanded,  I  beg  may  be 
sent  to  the  War  Department  for  immediate  publication. 

(Signed),     G.  G.  MEADE, 

Major-General,  Commanding. 

Your  attention  is  called  to  this  request  of  General  Meade 
for  the  immediate  publication  of  what  had  been  accomplished 
by  the  2d  and  6th  Corps  on  April  6th,  1865;  and  I  crave  your 
indulgence  to  the  following:  This  despatch  and  the  preceding 
one  need  to  be  read  together,  for  on  them  and  a  subsequent 
letter  to  be  introduced  later  on,  hangs  the  whole  story. 

On   page   624,    same   volume,    R.    R.,    you   will   find   the 

following : 

HEADQUARTERS  20  ARMY  CORPS, 

April  ?th,  1865,  3:20  p.  m. 
To  BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  WEBB, 

CHIEF  OF  STAFF. 

We  have  Heth,  Mahone,  and  I  believe  the  rest  of  Lee's  Army,  here 
in  my  front,  moving  towards  Lynchburg.  They  are  intrenched  in  a  too 


AT  FARMVILLE,  VIRGINIA.  53 

strong  position  for  me  to  attack  them  in  front,  and  their  flanks  extend 
further  than  mine.  They  are  extending  their  flank  to  my  right.  I  have 
sent  for  Barlow  but  I  do  not  know  at  what  time  he  will  be  up.  I  have 
just  seen  a  despatch  dated  1:20  P.M.,  saying  that  Farmville  is  in  our  pos 
session,  that  the  cavalry  were  moving  through  it. 

(Signed),     A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

Major-General,  Commanding. 

This  despatch  and  one  other,  it  is  believed  written  later  in 
the  day,  or  rather  evening,  confirmed  more  in  detail  the 
information  conveyed  in  the  despatch  of  3:20  p.  M.  of  April 
yth,  1865,  were  suppressed,  and  it  is  assumed,  in  fact  believed, 
these  despatches  were  not  published  to  the  North  when  it  was 
informed  of  what  had  been  done  by  others. 

Three  letters  from  General  Grant  to  General  Lee,  and  the 
replies  thereto  from  General  Lee  passed  through  the  picket 
lines  of  the  26.  corps.  The  first  one  from  Grant,  brought  by 
General  Seth  Williams,  A.G.,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  was  sent 
through  our  lines  about  6  or  7  p.  M.,  April  7th,  and  General 
Lee's  reply  was  delivered  to  us  within  one  hour.  (See  appen 
dix  "M"  "Virginia  Campaigns,  1864-65,"  pages  439  and 
440.) 

When  General  Lee  sought,  on  April  Qth,  1865,  an  interview 
with  General  Grant  with  a  view  of  surrendering  his  army,  this 
letter  of  General  Lee's  marked  No.  6  in  the  correspondence, 
passed  through  our  lines,  26.  Corps,  but  General  Grant  had 
then  left  the  route  pursued  by  the  2d  Corps,  and  had  gone  over 
to  that  of  Sheridan'and  Ord's.  (See  appendix  "  M  "  as  before 
referred  to. )  The  telegraph  was  freely  used,  keeping  the  North 
fully  advised  of  the  success  which  attended  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  this  campaign.  A  despatch  from  the  Honorable 
Secretary  of  War,  E.  M.  Stanton,  mentioned  Sheridan's  name 
only,  and  the  inference  naturally  drawrn  from  it  by  the  public 
was  the  generals  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  ' '  lag 
gards.  ' '  Webster  defines  the  word  ' '  laggard  ' '  to  mean  ' '  slow, 
sluggish  and  awkward,  one  who  lags  or  loiters."  The  writer 
whilst  hunting  for  evidence  on  which  to  base  an  application 
for  membership  to  the  Societies  of  the  ' '  Sons  of  the  American 
Revolution"  and  that  of  "Colonial  Wars,"  came  across, 


54  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

eighteen  months  ago,  a  letter  which  is  printed  in  a  volume 
edited  by  Dr.  Fred  Humphreys,  of  New  York  City,  called 
"  The  Humphreys'  .Family."  It  will  be  found  on  page  1005, 
and  reads:  "  You  would  not  think  that  I  had  lost  interest  in 
the  subject  of  your  letter  had  you  heard  me  talk  to  some 
Philadelphians  about  the  pursuit  of  Lee.  I  learned  only  this 
summer  of  the  effect  of  Stanton's  telegram  of  the  6th  or  yth 
of  April,  giving  the  whole  credit  of  overtaking  and  attacking 
Lee  on  the  6th  of  April  to  Sheridan.  There  they  said  in 
Philadelphia  (I  am  told)  the  generals  of  the  Army  of  Potomac 
are  laggards,  it  requires  Sheridan  and  Grant  to  overtake  Lee. 
What  an  outrage  on  Wright  and  myself  that  telegram  was. 
We,  laggards!  The  impression  thus  made  on  the  public,  in 
this  moment  of  success,  has  never  been  effaced;  it  remains  to 
this  day.  To  you,  I  am  indebted,  my  dear  General,  for  the 
first  presentation  of  the  subject  to  the  public  that  will  tend  to 
efface  this  impression."  This  letter  is  dated  September  29th, 
1872.  Here  is  the  despatch  referred  to: 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C., 

April  jth,  1865,  10:00  a.m. 
MAJOR-GENERAL,  Dix,  NEW  YORK. 

General  Sheridan  attacked  and  routed  Lee's  Army  yesterday,  cap 
tured  Generals  Ewell,  Kershaw,  Barton,  Corse  and  many  other  general 
officers,  several  thousand  prisoners  and  a  large  number  of  cannon,  and 
expects  to  force  Lee  to  surrender  all  that  is  left  of  his  army.  Details 
will  be  given  speedily  as  possible  but  the  telegraph  is  working  badly. 
(Signed),  EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

I  have  in  this  sketch  dwelt  somewhat  on  the  doings  of  the 
2d  Corps;  have  detailed  the  several  manoeuvres  of  the  forces 
which  were  pursuing  Lee.  I  believe  I  have  in  this  done  nothing 
to  disparage  the  glory  gained  by  other  troops  in  this  memorable 
campaign. 

Men  are  judged  of  either  by  their  actions  or  speech  or  by 
\vhat  they  have  written,  or  by  what  is  written  of  them  by 
another  as  their  views.  Surely  the  reproachful  word  ' '  lag 
gard,"  as  applied  to  these  distinguished  soldiers,  could  not 


AT    FARMVILIvE,  VIRGINIA.  55 

with  justice  be  affixed  to  either  Generals  Humphreys  or 
Wright,  in  view  of  what  has  been  accomplished  by  them  and 
their  corps. 

The  despatch  of  the  then  Honorable  Secretary  of  War  must 
have  been  written  either  under  a  false  impression,  derived  from 
the  despatches  read  by  him,  or  else  all  the  facts  had  not  been 
laid  before  him ;  or  else  there  had  been  a  wilful  suppression  of 
the  news  by  some  one. 

Yet  this  ugly  fact  remains,  the  despatches  referred  to  were 
at  that  time  suppressed,  as  also  one  other,  giving  more  in 
detail  Lee's  force  and  position  at  Cumberland  Church  or 
Farmville. 

General  Grant  knew  where  Lee's  army  was  and  what 
troops  of  his  were  nearest  to  Lee,  and  in  consequence  of  this 
proximity  used  the  2d  Corps  as  a  means  of  communicating 
with  Lee,  yet  one  of  the  so-called  "  laggards  "  commands  the 
only  troops  near  enough  to  permit  of  such  correspondence. 
General  Grant  further  recognizes  one  of  the  so-styled  ' '  lag 
gards  ' '  as  occupying  all  day,  in  front  of  General  Lee,  ' '  a  very 
hazardous  position."  A  peculiar  condition  of  affairs  for  one 
who  has  been  called  a  "laggard."  Generally  this  style  of 
man  is  found  well  to  the  rear  and  out  of  danger,  yet  he  is 
there  in  front  and  holds  on  with  a  grip  which  cannot  be  shaken 
off. 

It  is  needless  for  me  to  refer  further  to  the  detention  of  Lee 
at  Farmville,  whereby  Sheridan  in  his  brilliant  operations  has 
placed  himself  across  Lee's  line  of  retreat,  and  captured  his 
supplies;  for  the  cause  of  this  detention  has  been,  I  think, 
established  beyond  a  doubt  by  what  has  already  been  placed 
before  you;  but  least  I  have  not  done  so,  to  your  satisfaction, 
I  beg  leave  to  call  your  attention  to  the  following: 

In  a  work  entitled  ' '  Some  Federal  and  Confederate  Com 
manders,"  on  pages  94,  95  and  96,  will  be  found  the  following: 
( *  Following  the  narration  of  General  Walker  in  the  ' (  History 
of  the  2d  Army  Corps,"  it  may  fairly  be  contended  that  Hum 
phreys  compelled  Lee  to  lose  time  at  Farmville  Heights,  which 
he  could  not  regain  by  night  marches,  kept  him  from  obtaining 


56  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS. 

the  much  needed  supplies  waiting  for  him  at  Appomattox 
Station  and  gave  to  Sheridan  and  Ord  the  opportunity  to  put 
themselves  across  his  path  at  Appomattox  Court  House.  It  is 
worthy  of  note  that  General  Grant's  first  note  to  Lee,  demand 
ing  the  surrender  of  his  army  was  delivered  from  Humphreys 
front,  about  half-past  7  P.M.,  on  the  yth  of  April,  and  that 
Lee  returned  his  answer  within  an  hour  by  the  same  route. 

"Generals  Grant,   Ord,  and  Wright  rested  that  night  at 
Farmville,  about  eight  miles  in  rear  of  Humphreys'  position. 

"  The  end  came  next  day,  Humphreys'  foot  Cavalry  was  in 
at  the  death.  His  unerring  instinct  for  the  chase,  his  terrible 
persistency  and  aggressive  temper,  together  with  the  astound 
ing  celerity  of  his  movements  had  enabled  him  to  outstrip 
everything  but  the  cavalry,  and  to  keep  fully  abreast  even 
with  that. 

"  If  Sheridan  was  the  hero  of  the  cavalry,  in  this  splendid 
operation,  Humphreys  was  beyond  all  doubt  the  hero  of  the 
infantry.  Certain  it  is  that,  like  the  impatient  runner  in  the 
Olympian  games  he  would  never  have  merited  the  lash  for 
starting  up  too  soon,  nor  like  the  laggard,  have  failed  to 
deserve  his  crown  by  being  left  at  the  beginning  of  the  race. ' ' 

It  is  also  pertinent  to  this  subject  to  remark  (this  officer 
who  had  been  styled  by  the  public  a  ' '  laggard ' ' )  received 
from  the  hands  of  the  party  (who  had  written  this  unfortunate 
telegram)  one  of  the  best  gifts  at  the  disposal  of  the  nation, 
that  of  Chief  of  Engineers  U.  S.  Army,  and  this  commission 
bears  date  August  8th,  1866. 


Supplemental. 


HEADQUARTERS,  CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS, 

UNITED  STATES  ARMY, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  December  2gth,  1883. 
GENERAL  ORDERS,  No.  10. 

Again  the  painful  duty  devolves  upon  the  Brigadier-General  Com 
manding  of  announcing  to  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  the  death  of  a 
brother  officer. 

Brigadier-General  Andrew  A.  Humphreys,  Corps  of  Engineers 
(retired),  Brevet  Major-General,  United  States  Army,  died  in  this  city  on 
December  27,  1883. 

General  Humphreys  was  graduated  from  the  Military  Academy  and 
promoted  to  the  rank  of  Brevet  Second  Lieutenant,  Second  Artillery, 
July  i,  1831.  He  served  in  garrison  at  Fort  Moultrie,  S.  C.,  in  1831;  on 
temporary  duty  at  the  United  States  Military  Academy,  in  1832;  in  the 
Cherokee  Nation,  1832-33;  at  Augusta  Arsenal,  Ga.,  and  Fort  Marion, 
Fla.,  1833-34;  on  topographical  duty,  making  surveys  in  West  Florida 
and  at  Cape  Cod,  Mass.,  1834-35;  and  in  the  Florida  War  against  the 
Seminole  Indians  in  1836;  being  engaged  in  the  action  of  Oloklikaha, 
March  31,  1836,  and  action  near  Micanopy,  June  9,  1836.  On  September 
30,  1836,  he  resigned  his  commission  as  an  officer  of  the  United  States 
Army,  and  during  the  years  1836-38,  as  Civil  Engineer,  assisted  the  late 
General  Hartman  Bache  on  the  plans  of  Brandywine  Shoal  Lighthouse 
and  Crow  Shoal  Breakwater,  Delaware  Bay.  Upon  the  re-organization  of 
the  Corps  of  Topographical  Engineers  in  1838,  General  Humphreys  was 
re-appointed  in  the  army  with  the  rank  of  first  lieutenant  in  that  corps. 
He  served  in  charge  of  the  works  for  the  improvement  of  Chicago 
Harbor,  Ills.;  as  assistant  topographical  engineer  of  survey  of  Oswego 
Harbor  defenses,  N.  Y.,  and  in  charge  of  survey  of  Whitehall  Harbor, 
N.  Y.,  in  1839;  as  assistant  in  the  Topographical  Bureau,  at  Washington, 
D.  C.,  1840-41;  in  the  Florida  War,  1842;  on  construction  of  bridge  at 
Washington,  D.  C.,  1842;  as  assistant  in  Topographical  Bureau  at  Wash 
ington,  D.  C.,  1842-43-44;  as  assistant  in  charge  of  the  Coast  Survey 
Office,  at  Washington,  D.  C.,  1844-49;  and  on  surveys  in  the  field  1849-50. 

He  was  engaged  in  making  a  topographic  and  hydrographic  survey 
of  the  Delta  of  the  Mississippi  River  with  a  view  to  its  protection  from 

57 


58  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS. 

inundation,  and  deepening  the  channels  at  its  mouth,  1850-51,  continuing 
in  general  charge  of  the  work  and  preparing  his  able  and  voluminous 
report  thereon,  till  1861;  in  Europe  examining  means  for  protecting  Delta 
rivers  from  inundation,  1853-54;  in  general  charge,  under  the  War  De 
partment,  of  the  office  duties  at  Washington,  D.  C.;  connected  with  the 
explorations  and  surveys  for  railroads  from  the  Mississippi  River  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  and  geographical  explorations  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  1854-61;  as  member  of  the  Lighthouse  Board,  1856-62;  of  the 
Board  ' '  to  revise  programme  of  instruction  at  the  United  States  Military 
Academy,  and  of  the  Commission  created  by  Act  of  Congress  to  examine 
into  the  organization,  system  of  discipline,  and  course  of  instruction 
at  the  United  States  Military  Academy,  1860." 

He  served  during  the  rebellion  of  the  seceding  States,  1861-66,  on 
the  staff  of  Major-General  McClellan,  General  in  Chief,  at  Washington, 
D.  C.,  December  1861,  to  March  1862;  in  the  Virginia  Peninsula  cam 
paign,  as  chief  topographical  engineer,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  March  to 
August,  1862;  being  engaged  in  the  siege  of  Yorktown,  April  5~May  4, 
1862;  battle  of  Williamsburg,  May  6,  1862;  in  movements  and  operations 
before  Richmond  and  to  the  James  River,  May-June,  1862;  and  battle  of 
Malvern  Hill,  July  i,  1862. 

Appointed  brigadier-general,  United  States  Volunteers,  April  28, 
1862,  he  was  placed  in  command  of  a  division  of  new  troops  at  Washing 
ton,  D.  C.,  September,  1862,  and  served  in  the  Maryland  campaign  (Army 
of  the  Potomac),  September-November,  1862,  being  engaged  in  covering 
Frederick  Maryland,  September  16,  1862;  pursuit  of  enemy  from  Antie- 
tam,  September  18,  1862;  reconnaissance  in  Shenandoah  Valley,  October 
16-17,  1862,  and  march  to  Falmouth,  Va.,  October-November,  1862;  in 
the  Rappahannock  campaign  (Army  of  the  Potomac),  December,  1862- 
June  1863,  being  engaged  in  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  December  13, 
1862,  and  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  May  2-4,  1863;  in  the  Pennsylvania 
campaign  (Army  of  the  Potomac),  June-July,  1863,  being  engaged  in  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  July  1-3,  1863. 

He  was  appointed  Major-General  of  Volunteers,  July  8,  1863,  and 
served  as  chief  of  staff  to  Major  General  Meade,  commanding  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  from  that  date  until  November,  25,  1864,  being  engaged  in 
the  action  of  Manassas  Gap,  July  23,  1863;  the  Rapidan  operations, 
October-November,  1863,  including  the  actions  of  October  12  and  Nov 
ember  7,  1863,  on  the  Rappahannock,  and  Combat  at  Bristoe  Station, 
October  14,  1863;  operations  of  Mine  Run,  November  29-December  3d, 
1863;  action  of  the  Rapidan,  February  6,  1864;  battle  of  the  Wilderness, 
May  5-6,  1864;  battles  around  Spottsylvania,  May  9-20,  1864;  battles  of 
North  Anna,  May  23-26;  Tolopotomy,  May  28-30;  Cold  Harbor,  June  1-3, 
1864;  assaults  at  Petersburg,  June  16-18,  and  July  30  (mine),  1864; 
battles  of  Weldon  Railroad,  August  18-25,  1864;  action  of  Peeble's 


SUPPLEMENTAL.  59 

Farm,  September  30,  1864,  and  action  of  Boydton  Plankroad,  October 
27,  1864;  in  command  of  2d  Army  Corps,  November  25,  1864,  to  June 
27,  1865,  being  engaged  in  the  siege  of  Petersburg  till  its  fall,  April 
3,  1865,  including  the  action  of  Hatcher's  Run,  February  4-6,  1865,  and 
the  almost  daily  attacks  on  the  enemy's  works,  March  24,  to  April  3,  1865, 
and  pursuit  of  General  Lee's  Rebel  Army  (including  the  several  actions  of 
the  2d  Corps  April  6,  1865,  terminating  at  Sailor's  Creek,  and  actions 
at  High  Bridge  and  Farmville,  April  7,  1865),  till  its  surrender,  April  9, 
1865,  at  Appomattox  Court  House,  and  in  command  of  District  of  Pennsyl 
vania  in  Middle  Department,  July  28-December  9,  1865. 

From  December  9,  1865,  to  August  8,  1866,  he  was  in  charge  of  the 
examination  of  the  Mississippi  Levees.  On  August  8,  1866,  he  was 
appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  with  the  rank  of 
Brigadier-General,  and  Chief  of  Engineers,  serving  in  this  capacity  until 
his  retirement  from  active  service  at  his  own  request  on  June  30,  1879. 
He  served  as  member  of  the  Lighthouse  Board,  February  20,  1870,  to 
January  1874;  of  commission  to  examine  into  canal  routes  across  the 
isthmus  connecting  North  and  South  America,  1872-1877;  of  Board  on 
Washington  and  Georgetown  Harbor  improvements,  i872-'73;  of  Revising 
Board  of  Bulkhead  and  Pier  Line  of  Brooklyn  from  May,  1872,  to  June, 
1879,  °f  Staten  Island  from  August,  1878,  to  June,  1879,  and  of  Hudson 
River  (Troy  to  Hudson),  June  1877,  to  June,  1879;  of  Board  for  survey 
of  Baltimore  Harbor  and  adjacent  waters  from  May,  1876,  to  June,  1879*' 
of  Washington  Monument  Commission  from  January,  1877,  to  June,  1879; 
of  Advisory  Board  to  Massachusetts  Harbor  Commissioners  from  January, 
1877,  to  June  1879;  and  of  Examining  Board  of  Moline  Water  Power 
Company  contracts,  April- June,  1877. 

General  Humphreys  was  promoted  to  the  grade  of  Major,  Corps  of 
Topographical  Engineers,  United  States  Army,  August  6,  1861;  additional 
Aide-de-camp,  with  the  rank  of  Colonel,  March  5, 1862;  Brigadier-General 
of  Volunteers,  April  28,  1862;  Lieutenant-Colonel,  Corps  of  Engineers, 
United  States  Army,  March  3,  1863;  Major-Gen eral,  United  States  Vol 
unteers,  July  8,  1863,  and  Brigadier-General,  and  Chief  of  Engineers, 
United  States  Army,  August  8,  1866. 

He  received  the  brevets  of  Colonel,  United  States  Army,  for  gallant 
and  meritorious  services  in  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  Va. ,  of  Brigadier- 
General,  United  States  Army,  for  gallant  and  meritorious  services  in  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  Pa.,  and  of  Major-General,  United  States  Army,  for 
gallant  and  meritorious  services  in  the  battle  of  Sailor's  Creek,  Va. 

In  the  civil  duties  appertaining  to  his  profession  he  was  as  eminent  as 
in  his  military  duties  in  the  field.  He  was  a  member  of  the  American 
Philosophical  Society,  of  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  and  of  the  American  Academy 
of  Arts  and  Sciences,  of  Boston,  Mass.;  a  corporator  of  the  National 


60  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS. 

Academy  of  Science;  and  honorary  member  of  the  Imperial  Royal  Geolog 
ical  Institute  of  Vienna,  and  of  the  Royal  Institute  of  Science  and  Art  of 
IvOtnbardy,  Milan,  Italy;  and  corresponding  member  of  the  Geographical 
Society  of  Paris,  and  of  the  Austrian  Society  of  Engineer  Architects. 

Noble  in  all  the  attributes  of  manhood,  interesting  as  an  author,  able 
and  scientific  as  an  engineer,  brave  and  resolute  as  a  soldier,  courteous 
and  considerate  in  his  relations  with  his  associates,  the  Corps  of  Engineers 
to-day  mourns  the  death  of  one  who  stood  in  the  front  rank  of  the  ablest 
and  best  of  its  officers. 

No  words  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  can  add  to  his  well-earned  fame 
or  the  distinction  that  attaches  to  his  name;  these  are,  and  ever  will  remain 
a  part  of  the  history  of  the  Corps  and  of  the  service. 

As  a  testimonial  of  respect  for  the  deceased,  the  officers  of  the  Corps 
of  Engineers  will  wear  the  usual  badge  of  mourning  for  thirty  days. 

By  command  of  Brigadier-General  Wright. 

(Signed),     JOHN  M.  WILSON, 

Major  of  Engineers, 
Brevet-Colonel,  U.  S.  A. 

[NOTE.] 

Degree  of  IvL.D.,  conferred  by  Harvard  College,  July  15,  1868. 
Honorary  Member,  Italian  Geographical  Society,  1880. 
Corresponding  Member,  Maryland  Historical  Society,  December  10, 
1877. 

Member  of  the  Hungarian  Society  of  Engineers,  January,  1885. 


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